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INTRODUCTION 
The London Stock Exchange in terms of market capitalization is the largest stock 
exchange in Europe and the third largest in the world. Every year a large number of companies 
join public markets - the Main Market and Alternative Investment Market (AIM – for smaller, 
growing companies), in order to grow and enhance the business. The decision to go public is 
viewed as a decision to develop the business and expand the companies’ capital. Nevertheless, 
some companies decide to leave the market over the time. 
Hence, many questions remain regarding the factors that influence the company's 
decision to leave the public market, and the rationale for this step. In fact, the going private 
transactions from the London Stock Exchange take place every year and for the last 7 years a 
number of going private transactions equals to 1435 from both markets. 
Over the past decade, delisting has become a common event in all international stock 
markets. In the US a sharp increase in the number of LBO occurred in the early 1980s. The first 
studies of delisting motives began to appear only in the mid-1980s. According to the Securities 
Data Company in the US stock markets since 1996, more than 900 delistings have taken place. 
In Europe, from 1995 to 2005, more than 25% of traded companies carried out delisting through 
LBO and non-LBO. Thus, the delisting procedure is a method of transition to a private legal 
organizational form, which occurs in various stock markets and has several types. 
There are a number of reasons of a company being delisted: 
1. Voluntary, such as going private or “going dark transaction” (move to the over-
the-counter markets) or being bought out by another company or private equity 
firm. 
and 
2. Involuntary, such as violation of the requirements of the stock exchange and/or 
poor financial performance of the company.  
The thesis focuses on the voluntary going private transactions. 
The reasons why public companies can leave the public market and become private are 
quite a new topic in financial literature. One of the most common determinants of such a 
decision for going private transaction is the desire to reduce the agency costs, eliminating the 
separation between ownership and management, with some share of undistributed cash flow used 
as a proxy for the extent of such conflicts (Jensen 1986). Kim and Lyn (1991) continued the 
study and in addition found evidence that companies carrying out delisting were underestimated 
and demonstrated a decrease in financing through the issuance of shares. These companies are 
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concentrated in industries with stable cash flows, have unemployed debt capacity, high agency 
costs of free cash flow and are usually smaller in size than firms that do not delist. 
Weir (2005) and Renneboog (2007) studied the sources of benefits for shareholders in 
case of delisting of the companies in the UK. The authors in the studies came to the common 
conclusions that the company is less likely to suffer from high agency costs arising from the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers if the share in the hands of one or more 
shareholders is higher, and also there is a careful control by other shareholders. Their analysis 
showed that, indeed, companies, which in the opinion of management were underestimated, 
delisted more often. Also, the companies that carried out delisting were undervalued by the 
market. The authors showed that, compared to firms that remained public, private companies 
were smaller, younger, more diversified, and had lower growth opportunities, measured with the 
Tobin’s Q coefficient. 
Bharath and Dittmar (2010) used Cox proportional hazard model to determine the factors 
influencing the companies’ decision to delist. Their results confirmed the importance of FCF, 
growth prospects, access to the capital and the liquidity of shares as highlighted in previous 
studies. Martinez and Serve (2011) exploited the specificity of going-private transactions in 
Continental Europe. The results they obtained confirmed traditional motives derived from the 
analysis of costs and benefits: when the advantages of listing are reduced because of weak 
liquidity and/or weak analytical coverage, companies consider it more profitable to delist. In 
addition, the characteristics of companies that delist (i.e. productivity, financial leverage and 
risk) have proved to be important determinants for delisting. 
Kashefi-Pour and Lasfer (2013) studied the decisions of the companies to voluntary delist 
from the Alternative Investment Market. Their findings show that firms with higher leverage, 
lower growth opportunities and lower capital expenditures are more likely to voluntarily delist 
from the AIM. Marosi and Massoud (2007) and Leuz (2008) analyzed US firms and found that 
voluntarily delisted firms are smaller and have lower free cash flows than the firms that stayed 
public. These findings suggest that there might be different factors of going private transaction 
for companies on Main Market and Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock 
Exchange.  
This leads to the research question and research goal of the paper. In this study the 
following question is answered: “Which determinants are related to the probability of a company 
being delisted?”  
The research goal is to determine the factors, which are related to the company’s decision 
to go private. In order to meet the research goal the following objectives were set: 
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 To conduct a literature review on the subject of delisting and identify the factors 
associated with the company's decision to change the ownership structure. 
 To present the theories describing the motives of companies for the procedure of 
delisting based on the review of the contemporary scientific research. 
 To conduct an empirical study aimed at identifying the determinants of the change 
of the legal form of the companies, which carried out the delisting from the 
Alternative Investment Market and the Main Market of the London Stock 
Exchange. 
 To draw conclusions on the work and to formulate a list of managerial future 
references. 
The object of the study is a sample of all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
on AIM and Main Market at any point in time during the period between 2005 and 2016. The 
subject is a going private transaction of the company from the stock exchange. 
This master thesis is an empirical research, so for the purpose of the study the statistical 
and econometric analysis with the help of Stata software is implemented.  
The main sources of information for the master thesis are: academic articles devoted to 
motivations for conducting going private transaction, theoretical justifications of the 
determinants and specific factors of delistings; monographies aimed at the study of the going 
private transactions; professional periodical literature (Journal of Finance, The Financial Times 
and others); text editions devoted to the analysis of the panel data, hazard and survival functions. 
In addition to Thomson Reuters Eikon, Thomson Reuters Datastream, SKRIN, SPARK, 
ZEPHYR databases, reports on the London Stock Exchange Statistics Center and annual reports 
available on official websites of companies are used for the purpose of regression analysis. 
The following structure of the paper was chosen in order to achieve the stated goal and 
objectives. The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the going private transaction, 
justification of the theories describing going private transactions and analysis of the delisting 
cases. Moreover, in the first chapter the research hypotheses of this paper are formulated and the 
description of the variable for the empirical study is introduced. 
In the second chapter the research methodology applied in the thesis, sample selection 
process and descriptive statistics of the variables included in the sample is described. 
Furthermore, the results of the econometric analysis as well as the main findings of the paper are 
discussed. Based on the results of the theoretical and econometric study the managerial 
implications are developed. 
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CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
1.1 The concept of delisting 
In the corporate finance literature the decisions of companies on the transition to a public 
organizational and legal form (IPO implementation - initial public offering of shares) are often 
investigated. The reverse action, that is the transition to a private legal organizational form, or 
delisting, is much less studied, despite its importance for companies. If the IPO decision is 
usually viewed as a stage of company’s growth, there are many questions about the conditions 
under which the public company moves to a private form, as well as the rationale for this step. 
Full delisting can be of two types: voluntary delisting and forced. In the context of forced 
(or involuntary) delisting the company is subject to withdrawal from stock markets due to the 
fact that it is experiencing financial difficulties or will be merged and/or acquired by another 
firm. The case of a voluntary delisting is a process of change in the shareholder structure. 
Further, studies related to both types of delisting, in which the authors studied the reasons for the 
companies' decisions to withdraw from the stock exchanges, will be considered. 
1.2  Voluntary delisting 
Voluntary delisting occurs when a public company decides to become private. Both 
existing and potential shareholders seeking to concentrate the property in their hands and not 
wanting to leave the company traded publicly can initiate the process of a voluntary delisting. 
In addition, voluntary delisting can take different forms depending on the country. In the 
United States and the United Kingdom, voluntary delisting, basically, takes the form of 
Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO): traded companies are acquired by private equity investors through 
borrowed capital. After the implementation of the LBO, the acquired company leaves the stock 
market, having carried out delisting. In most cases, an untraded company is created specifically 
for acquisitions. Such transactions on the transition from public to private legal organizational 
form are most often directed to companies, in which the share of stocks in the hands of the 
largest shareholders is small. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon countries, most European firms, especially 
in continental Europe, have a large shareholding base (Lang and Faccio 2002). In such cases, the 
prevailing practice to switch from a public to a private legal organizational form is a Buy-out 
Offer with Squeeze-Out (BOSO). Squeeze-Out is a transaction, in which controlling 
shareholders can exercise their legal right to buy back minority shareholders for cash. This 
transaction makes the company completely private and controlled solely.  
11 
 
In Europe, the BOSO transaction is governed by the Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers
1
 
and allows the major shareholder to oblige minority shareholders to sell their shares in exchange 
for fair rewards. Unlike LBO, BOSOs are initiated by corporations or the owners' families, rather 
than by private equity investors. Given the different aspects of BOSO and LBO, the incentives 
and drivers behind these types of legal organizational form change are different. That is, the 
method of delisting will depend on the share in the hands of the controlling shareholder and the 
form of ownership. In addition, the differences in the form of delisting are related to those who 
initiated the transition from public to private legal organizational form. 
The number of delisting decisions is closely related to the existence of institutional 
mechanisms that more closely regulate corporate governance. External mechanisms, such as the 
application of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) law in the USA, or the Financial Security Law (FSL) 
in France or The Companies Act 18 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
2
 in 
India, are often referred to as a driving force for Implementation of delisting. This is due to the 
fact that compliance with these requirements forces companies to incur high compliance costs 
imposed by these rules. On the other hand, the fulfillment of these requirements increases the 
efficiency of the company's management. In case of effective and quality compliance with the 
rules imposed by external mechanisms, the company will not be excluded from the stock 
exchange and will increase its own efficiency. Indeed, for companies with weak corporate 
governance there is an incentive to be private in order to eliminate conflicts between 
management and shareholders who have access to financial statements. 
Therefore, the reasons for the delisting decision can be both internal (decision of 
shareholders of the company) and external (for example, problems with compliance with the 
requirements of the exchange). Further, the analysis of studies aimed at studying the 
determinants of delisting will be conducted. 
In the research of DeAngelo (1984) the author reviewed the organizational structure of 
LBO in the US market. In this paper, the author investigated the motives for such transactions 
and their implications for minority shareholders. In addition, the author tested gains-sharing 
propositions and found the average effect of the increase of the owner's income due to stocks 
purchase from the delisting proposal and the average effect of decreasing income in refusing the 
original delisting decision. The research emphasizes that the transition to a private legal 
organizational form potentially creates benefits by reducing the cost of listing (registration, 
                                               
1 Directive 2004/25/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 21 April 2004. On takeover 
bids. EUR-Lex. Accessed January 20, 2017. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004L0025. 
2 Securities and Exchange Board of India. (2013). The companies act no 18. Ministry of Corporate Affairs. 
Government of India. 
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listing maintenance and other service costs of the stockholders). As an example there is Barbara 
Lynn Stores, Inc., in which the cost of maintaining the listing for 10 years was about 1 million 
US dollars, while the market value of the company before the announcement of the decision on 
delisting was estimated at 1.383 million US dollars. In addition, delisting led to the introduction 
of an ownership structure that improved the incentives and effectiveness of corporate decision-
makers. 
First of all, it was noted in the study that when moving to a private form, the most 
significant increase in profits was felt when the managers’ incentives (ex-post) were more 
closely associated with over-fulfillment (ex-ante) of the plan (discretionary effort). Also, since 
the ownership interest of management increased due to the increase in shareholdings with LBO, 
managers took their decisions more responsibly, since they could lose their own assets in case of 
incorrect actions. 
The author of the research conducted a study using a standard event-time methodology to 
analyze the benefits for minorities from the announcement of the delisting and the subsequent 
withdrawal from the stock market, as well as the decision to abandon the already announced 
delisting. 
The study was conducted on a sample of companies formed on the basis of information 
from the issues of The Wall Street Journal Index for the period from 1973 to 1980. As a result of 
the analysis, during the period under review, the selected companies announced the transition to 
a private legal organizational form. The final sample comprised of 81 companies, 72 of which 
made a voluntary decision on delisting, 9 – involuntary decision. 
The authors (Fibirova and Petera 2013) tested the gain-sharing hypothesis (encouraging 
management to improve the company's productivity, reducing costs) for public owners of 
company shares when (1) declaring a delisting decision and (2) abandoning the announced 
delisting. This hypothesis implies a positive effect on the income of the owner of shares at (1) 
and the negative effect at (2). The authors concluded that both hypotheses were confirmed, and 
the increase in the income of the owners of the shares increased, on average, by 22.27% with (1) 
and decreased, on average, by 8.88% with (2). 
Besides this, the authors investigated the hypothesis of the size of the company and the 
potential benefits of cancellation of the listing. This hypothesis implies that the larger the 
company, the potentially more effective it is in depreciating fixed costs. The authors concluded 
that small companies will be more motivated to leave the public market when the direct costs of 
maintaining the listing will increase (the cost of IPO registration and the commission for the 
placement of securities, including annual listing fees imposed by the exchange and regulatory 
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bodies). As for indirect costs (reduction of expected benefits from public form), underestimation 
of the company's value is an example of the alternative cost that is generated due to the 
asymmetry of information between managers/owners and investors of the stock market. Unlike 
investors, management has more complete internal information about the company and knows 
the true distribution of future profits. Therefore, underestimation of the company's value occurs 
when the market price of the stock does not fully reflect the true value of the company. 
Kim and Lyn (1991) continued the study of DeAngelo (1984) and conducted their 
research of the American companies that announced delisting. The authors again took the 
information on the delistings of the companies from The Wall Street Journal Index. The sample 
included 53 companies that delisted from 1976 to 1984. The sample in this study was smaller, 
because the authors introduced a number of limitations. The sample of companies that did not 
delist was formed by a random selection of each 20th company in the alphabetical list of 
different industries. This sample includes 78 companies. 
The authors considered four hypotheses in their study: 
1. Agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) as a motive for delisting. Delisting with a 
view to reduce dividend payments. 
2. Agency debt costs (Debt) as a delisting motive (companies that carry out delisting 
have less financial leverage than companies that remain public). 
3. Informational asymmetry and Stock Undervaluation as a motive for delisting. 
4. Hypothesis of the size of the company. 
For each hypothesis, the authors selected the financial indicators of the companies that 
were used as variables. These characteristics of companies that carried out delisting were 
compared with the characteristics of companies that did not delist using a single-factor and 
multifactor analysis. 
All the hypotheses of scientific research were confirmed, and the authors obtained the 
expected signs for the variables. One-factor analysis was used to find differences between the 
companies that delisted and not. A linear probability model was also used to explain the 
motivation for delisting. The authors found that the companies carrying out delisting were 
underestimated and demonstrated a decrease in financing through the issuance of shares. These 
companies are concentrated in industries with stable cash flows, have unemployed debt capacity, 
high agency costs of free cash flow, and are usually smaller in size than firms that do not delist. 
Both analyses offer evidence in accordance with three hypotheses about free cash flow, 
information asymmetry and underestimation of the value of shares, as well as agency costs of 
debt. 
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The key conclusion of this work was that when management representatives know that 
the value of shares in companies is undervalued, they can decide to delist for strategic reasons in 
order to extract personal benefits and avoid the costs of maintaining the listing. 
The question of listing on the stock exchange or leaving it also depends on the point of 
view of potential investors. One way to identify interest is to study the liquidity of shares and the 
associated trade costs. As numerous studies and models have shown (i.e. (Amihud 1998), 
(Bolton and Von Thadden 1998), (Boot, Gopalan and Thalor 2006)), the liquidity of stock 
trading is an important motive for existing in a public legal organizational form. As a 
consequence, if liquidity deteriorates, the firm will more likely become private. 
One of the advantages of maintaining the status of a public company is the possibility of 
sharing the joint risk with the shareholders. Shah (1988) showed that when the controlling 
shareholder has more complete internal information about the distribution of revenues from the 
firm's assets, the status of the public company is attractive because it allows the risk to be shared 
more effectively with the shareholders (investors can eliminate unsystematic risk by diversifying 
the portfolio). On the other hand, a firm can delist when unsystematic risk is low, and the 
company's publicity no longer provides the benefits of risk sharing. 
In Anglo-Saxon countries, the dominant form of transition to a private form is LBO, 
which is often aimed at companies with a low stake in the hands of the largest shareholders. In 
this case, the main motive for the transition to a private form is related to agency theory: LBO is 
seen as a means to reduce the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. The main 
dilemma is how to achieve that management acted in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen 
1986), which provides two possible explanations for the decision to delist through LBO. 
One possible explanation is the hypothesis of the reorganization of incentives: it is 
necessary to combine the incentives of managers with incentives of shareholders. Kaplan 
(1989a) cites this hypothesis as an important factor in a delisting decision. Delisting allows 
combining the ownership of the company with a direct management, since a company with a 
large number of shareholders is acquired by several investors who actually begin to manage and 
own the company. As a consequence, the increase in shareholders' income that arises from 
delisting provides an opportunity to receive incentives for managers and motivates them to act in 
accordance with the interests of investors. The increase in profits indicated by the author in the 
study is associated with reduced agency costs, new incentives for managers, transfer of a share in 
the company from managers and ordinary shareholders to investment groups, as well as 
information from managers that is not held by shareholders. Also, Kaplan (1989b) first 
announced tax incentives as the main source of value creation for 76 Management Buy-Outs 
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(MBO) from 1980 to 1986. The median value of the benefit from tax benefits varied between 
21% and 143% of the premium paid to shareholders before buy-out. The estimated value of 
gains from tax benefits depends on the rate of repayment of buy-out debt and the tax rate applied 
to interest payments. The study also provides data on the actual taxes paid and rates for 
repayment of debt by these companies after the repurchase. The results in this article suggest that 
tax benefits are an important source of wealth growth for an MBO. 
Another explanation of the delisting decision through LBO is the free cash flow 
hypothesis (FCF). High credit obligations associated with LBO suggest a reduction in free cash 
flow by managers, because most of the cash is needed to repay the debt. 
In countries of continental Europe, including Russia, corporate governance models differ 
from Anglo-Saxon countries, as the ownership structure is more concentrated. According to 
Lang and Faccio (2002), in the countries of continental Europe the largest stake of the 
shareholder is approximately two times larger than in the Anglo-Saxon countries in LBO 
transactions. 
Weir (2005) and Renneboog (2007) analyzed the sources of benefits for shareholders in 
case of delisting of the companies in the UK. In the research papers of these authors the presence 
of a high concentration of ownership implies more careful control before the delisting by 
external shareholders who do not manage the company and do not belong to the owning family. 
Thus, the authors in the studies came to the common conclusions that the company is less likely 
to suffer from high agency costs arising from the conflict of interests between shareholders and 
managers if the share in the hands of one or more shareholders is higher, and also there is a 
careful control by other shareholders. Consequently, if the hypothesis of incentive reorganization 
explains the delisting of European companies, it is not a strong driver in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. 
Weir (2005) included companies that delisted from 1998 to 2001 in the final sample. The 
author investigated the reasons for the delisting decision by comparing the characteristics of the 
117 companies that became private through LBO, with a random sample of 362 companies that 
remained public. 
The author tested seven hypotheses: 
H1a: Companies that suspect that the value of their shares is undervalued are more likely 
to delist. 
H1b: Companies that are really undervalued are more likely to delist. 
H2: Companies with a higher board (more shares of board members) and more shares 
from institutional investors are more likely to delist. 
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H3a: Companies that do not adapt recommended management structures are more likely 
to delist. 
H3b: Companies, in which the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors is one 
person, are more likely to delist. 
H4: Companies with fewer non-executive directors are more likely to delist. 
H5: Companies with a higher FCF are more likely to delist. 
H6: Companies with less growth prospects are more likely to delist. 
H7: Delisting companies pay more taxes than those that remain private. 
The authors used a multivariate regression analysis. In the study the hypotheses H1a, 
H1b, H3b, H5 were confirmed. The remaining hypotheses were rejected. 
Logistic regression analysis showed that, indeed, companies, which in the opinion of 
management were underestimated, delisted more often. Also, the companies that carried out 
delisting were undervalued by the market. Companies that carried out delisting had a board of 
directors with a large number of shares and a large number of external shareholders. Companies 
that carried out delisting were less likely to have Duality (H3b), adapted recommendations and 
had more non-executive directors. 
The authors showed that, compared to firms that remained public, private companies 
were smaller, younger, more diversified and had lower growth opportunities, measured with the 
Tobin’s Q coefficient. 
Renneboog (2007) set a goal to test the sources of the expected value from delisting and 
distinguish between: tax incentives, restructuring of managerial incentives, FCF, cost reduction 
operations and underestimation of the company value. 
The authors found that the main sources of increase in shareholders' wealth are 
underestimation of the value of the target firm before the transaction, tax cuts in interest 
payments and restructuring of rewards for 177 British companies that delisted from 1997 to 
2003. These studies, carried out by Weir (2005) and Renneboog (2007) indicated two important 
differences from studies in the US. First, the authors found little evidence in favor of the FCF 
hypothesis. Secondly, tax benefits for companies financed by borrowings were less in the British 
market. 
Given that corporate governance in continental Europe differs from that in the UK and 
the US (Lang and Faccio 2002), the motives for direct investment transactions and the 
characteristics of goals may also differ. The most important difference is ownership and control. 
While the most of public companies in the United States and Great Britain belong to a large 
number of shareholders, the most of continental European companies have large shareholders, 
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such as families. Given the size of their stake, these large shareholders are likely to have some 
incentives to control the management. Achleitner (2013) considered the problem of how the 
ownership structure influences the delisting decision of buyout by a private equity investor. The 
sample included 1295 companies for the period from 1997 to 2007. 
The authors analyzed the role of direct private investment transactions in continental 
Europe and made seven hypotheses of scientific research: 
H1: The probability that a company will be taken over by a private equity investor is 
reduced if the company has an active, controlling shareholder. 
H2: A company with a shareholder who owns a large stake of the shares and who enjoys 
private benefits from control is less likely to be attractive for buying by a private equity investor. 
H3: Private equity investors are more likely to invest in companies with a relatively low 
and relatively high proportion of shares in the hands of management. 
H4: The probability of acquiring by a private equity company by an investor is higher for 
firms with low leverage ratios and high tax debt. 
H5: Private equity investors prefer to buy companies with low debt load and high levels 
of FCF. 
H6: Private equity investors are more likely to acquire companies with stable cash flows. 
H7: The probability of acquiring a company by the private equity investor is negatively 
related to the liquidity of the company's shares. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were confirmed, but only if the authors divided the owners of a large 
block of shares by type. Hypotheses were confirmed for companies where the largest owner was 
the family, but not confirmed with another type of owners. Hypotheses 3 and 6 were rejected, 
while hypotheses 4 and 5 were accepted. 
So, not all major shareholders can participate in the management of the company. In 
other words, if a large shareholder controls management, this is likely to make the firm less 
attractive to private equity investors, given that there is less potential to create value for the 
latter. On the other hand, a large shareholder who is unable to control the management, perhaps 
because of lack of skills, may be more intent to sell her/his company to a private equity investor. 
In addition, strong control can also generate indirect costs, since large shareholders can use their 
management rights to extract personal benefits of control from the firm at the expense of other 
shareholders. As a result, private equity investors can avoid companies, in which controlling 
shareholders derive private benefits of control and who are ready to sell their shareholdings only 
for a premium that is high enough to compensate for the loss of their benefits. 
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Achleitner (2013) has proved that the likelihood that a company becomes an object of 
acquiring by a private equity investor depends on the incentives for monitoring and the private 
benefits of control enjoyed by existing large shareholders. Nevertheless, this picture arose only 
when the authors separated different types of large shareholders, and this only applied to firms, 
in which the ultimate controlling shareholder was the family. This provides additional evidence 
about the types of shareholders who control the management and those who do not. The results 
show that family companies are likely to expropriate minority shareholders in their firms, unlike 
other types of holders of a large shareholding. 
In addition, the transition to private legal organizational form in companies located in 
continental Europe often leads to a conflict of interests between majority and minority 
shareholders (Croci 2014): while large shareholders try to extract private benefits of control, 
small shareholders have little that they can oppose. In addition, the authors examined how the 
ownership structure influenced the delisting decision. On a sample of 882 delisting cases via 
LBO and non-LBO, the authors investigated the market response to a delisting announcements 
and operational activities after delisting. 
The authors made two hypotheses of the scientific research: 
H1: Compared to other delisting, delistings carried out by the controlling shareholder 
showed lower profitability during the announcement of the delisting decision and higher 
operating performance after delisting. 
H2: Compared to other delisting, delistings carried out by a family of shareholders have 
shown lower returns and higher and improved performance after delisting. 
They found that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the event window were 
negatively related to the shareholding of the largest shareholder, which corresponds to the 
assumption implied by the agency theory. The hypothesis of undervaluation was confirmed. 
Finally, they found that operating activities after delisting of family companies were better than 
of those companies that were excluded by other owners. Operating activities after delisting were 
measured solely on financial statements, since the value of shares after delisting was no longer 
available. As an indicator of operating activity, the authors used the return on assets ratio. 
In case of delisting through BOSO, the controlling shareholder group owns 90% or more 
of the voting rights at the time of BOSO, since before the initiation of the buyout offer from 
minority shareholders, the major shareholders established a second corporation that initiates 
merger with the original corporation. Shareholders using this technique are then in a position to 
dictate a merger plan. They legally oblige minority shareholders of the original corporation to 
accept monetary compensation for their shares. Thus, agency conflicts between managers and 
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owners take a second priority, while conflicts between large and minority shareholders play 
center stage. 
The vast majority of transactions through LBO occur with significant use of borrowed 
capital. Consequently, many authors in their researches have focused on the form of delisting 
and the use of sources of financing, as well as their impact on financial performance of 
companies. 
In many studies, tax benefits are seen as a key factor in conducting delisting through 
LBO. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) in their study put two issues of scientific research: 
1. Do the companies that carry out delisting have a much larger undistributed cash 
flow than similar companies that did not delist? 
2. Is the undistributed cash flow an important determinant of the premium paid 
during the delisting process? 
So, the authors note that tax benefits are an important source of increasing profits in the 
US market, since interest payments on corporate debt are not taxable. A significant increase in 
cash flows creates a large tax shield, and after delisting through LBO is carried out, companies 
do not pay almost any taxes for a long period, which increases the company's profits and, in 
particular, the income of the company's owners. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) on a sample of 263 
LBOs from 1980 to 1987 found that the likelihood that a company will perform delisting is 
directly related to the share of undistributed cash flows. In addition, the authors found that the 
undistributed cash flow is a determinant of premiums paid to shareholders during the delisting. 
Both results of scientific research were more significant for firms that delisted from 1984 to 
1987, when the number of buyouts was significantly higher than in other years, as well as for 
companies where managers owned a fairly small percentage of shares before delisting. 
In case of delisting through BOSO, tax benefits have less effect of tax benefits, because 
such transaction requires less financial leverage than LBO. Nevertheless, consideration of the 
issue of additional borrowing often also influences the final decision of delisting: if the firm no 
longer needs access to the securities market and does not have financial obligations to maintain 
the listing, the decision of delisting may reveal preferences of alternative sources of financing, 
such as debt. This preference is fair provided that there are fewer benefits from listing, and 
higher costs are associated with maintaining the listing (Bharath and Dittmar 2010), (Martinez 
and Serve 2011). In addition, the authors in their works paid special attention to the situation, in 
which companies no longer need access to the securities market, and for them lack of 
opportunities for growth and investment projects may be another incentive for delisting. 
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Bharath and Dittmar (2010) argued that since theories of entering the stock exchanges are 
theories of a tradeoff type (the choice of the optimal level of financing by debt and equity), they 
can also be used to analyze the decision of firms for the transition to private legal organizational 
form. 
The authors conducted a study on a sample of US companies from IPO to delisting 
between 1980 and 2004 (1881 firm-years) and compared these firms with a sample of companies 
that entered the IPO and remained public (6640 firms-years). The authors used Cox proportional 
hazard model to determine the factors influencing the companies’ decision to delist. 
First, their results confirmed the importance of FCF, the liquidity and transparency of 
financial transactions, as highlighted in previous studies. 
Secondly, they determined the importance of the ownership structure, as well as the 
importance of the benefits and costs of maintaining the status of a public company. Thus, they 
found that firms carrying out delisting through LBO had lower institutional ownership, a larger 
stake in the hands of a large shareholder and more informed trading (the situation when more 
traders are aware of the company) at the time of the IPO than companies that remained on the 
stock market. 
Martinez and Serve (2011) studied voluntary delistings for the period from 1997 to 2006. 
Their study was conducted on a sample of French companies delisted through BOSO. The 
authors considered the specifics of transactions initiated by historical holders of a controlling 
stake. The sample of the study consisted of 70 companies that voluntarily carried out delisting 
through BOSO, and 70 companies from similar industries that were public. The results they 
obtained confirmed traditional motives derived from the analysis of costs and benefits: when the 
advantages of listing are reduced because of weak liquidity and/or weak analytical coverage, 
companies consider it more profitable to delist. In addition, the characteristics of companies that 
delist (i.e. productivity, financial leverage and risk) have proved to be important determinants for 
delisting. Complementary results of the study showed the difference between driving factors of 
delisting depending on the controlling shareholder. 
In this section, various reasons for companies to delist were considered depending on the 
type of transaction (LBO and BOSO) and location (US, UK, continental Europe). These reasons 
relate to situations when delisting is a voluntary decision of the company's management. 
Nevertheless, there are other situations, in which delisting is a forcing measure. In the next 
section such situations are considered and described. 
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1.2.1  Stock Exchange Description and Delisting Decisions 
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in London (UK) is an international market for 
small, growing companies. A wide range of businesses, including early stage, venture capital-
backed businesses and more established companies, join the AIM seeking access to growth 
capital. This market is one of the most successful growth markets in the world. Since its launch 
in 1995, over 3000 companies from across the globe have chosen to join the AIM. The AIM 
helps smaller and growing companies to raise the capital they need for expansion. This financing 
has enabled AIM companies to fund their development and pursue their growth ambitions. 
Additionally, this market provides companies with the opportunity to raise capital on a market 
with a pragmatic approach to regulation. To join the AIM, companies are not required to have a 
particular financial track record or trading history. The AIM’s balanced regulatory regime was 
designed specifically for smaller, growing companies, offering opportunities to both companies 
and investors. The AIM has a large, diverse and committed community of stakeholders. 
Specialist advisers are crucial to the market’s success and range from dedicated Nominated 
Advisers who play a central role in the life of an AIM company, to lawyers, accountants and 
brokers. Other important participants include public relations and investor relations agencies that 
help companies to join the market and make the most of their AIM quotation.
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According to AIM statistics, the market began trading 10 SME firms from various 
countries in June 1995. In 1999, there were 347 SMEs, with the number of firms peaking in 
2007, when 1694 SMEs were trading. The number of firms listed on the AIM has decreased 
from 2007, following the financial crisis. As of December 31st 2016, there were only 986 SMEs. 
There is a rule for all companies that they had either to comply with the code of the stock 
exchange or to explain to their shareholders why they had not done so.  
The London Stock Exchange’s Main Market is the world’s most international market for 
the admission and trading of equity, debt and other securities. Its location at the heart of the 
world’s leading financial center makes it the market to over 1500 companies from 60 countries, 
including many of the world’s largest, most successful and most dynamic firms. As of December 
31st 2016, there were 1298 companies on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. The 
regulation on the Main Market is stricter. When the exchange believes that there is a breach of 
the standards, it may commence disciplinary action against companies. The exchange may 
announce a warning notice and/or refer disciplinary matters and, as a result, involuntary delist 
the company from the market. 
                                               
3 AIM: the most successful growth market. London Stock Exchange. Accessed February 2, 2017. Retrieved 
from http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/for-companies/companies.htm. 
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The Main Market is also one of the world's most international and diverse stock markets, 
with companies coming from over 60 countries across 40 sectors. There are different routes to 
join the Main Market, which are outlined below: 
 The Premium listing status is only available for trading companies and closed and 
open-ended investment entities. Issuers with a premium listing are required to 
meet the UK’s rules, which are stricter than the EU minimum requirements. Due 
to the fact that premium listed companies comply with the UK’s highest standards 
of regulation and corporate governance, they may enjoy a lower cost of capital 
because of greater transparency and through building investor confidence. 
 The Standard listing is open to issuance of equity shares, Global Depositary 
Receipts (GDRs), debt securities, and securitized derivatives that are required to 
comply with EU minimum requirements. A Standard Listing allows issuers to 
access the Main Market by meeting EU harmonized standards. 
 The Specialist Fund Segment is a segment of Main Market, which is designed for 
highly specialized investment entities that wish to target institutional, highly 
knowledgeable investors or professionally advised investors only.
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The distribution of AIM and Main Market companies by equity market value is presented 
on Figure 1. Companies on AIM are, on average, smaller in market capitalization. Most of the 
companies on Main Market are larger than 100 million of UK pounds in terms of market value of 
equity, while most of the companies on AIM are smaller than 50 million of UK pounds. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of AIM and Main Market companies by equity market value in millions of UK 
pounds. Source: according to http://www.londonstockexchange.com%2Fstatistics%2Fhistoric%2Fmain-
market%2Fmain-market-factsheet-archive-2017%2Fmar-17.xls 
                                               
4 About the Main market. London Stock Exchange. Accessed February 2, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-market/main/market.htm. 
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According to the UK regulation, a company that decides to go private should notify the 
London Stock Exchange to cancel its trading on the exchange at least 20 days prior to such date. 
In AIM, the decision to go private should be approved by more than 75% of shareholders in the 
meeting. The Main market also incorporates a somewhat equivalent transaction for the delisting. 
The company advises the exchanges of the delisting intention at least 20 days in advance. It also 
needs to announce its intention through a regulated information service. Once the intention is 
agreed, “the exchange will announce the intention to cancel individual securities through the 
reference data service and the intention to cancel issuers through a regulated information 
service”.5 Shareholders’ approval of more than 75% for the going private transaction is needed 
for standard listed companies. Premium listed do not need the shareholders’ approval. Once the 
company is delisted from the exchange, it becomes private and shareholders have two options: 
they can either sell their shares before the delisting date with a premium or remain shareholders 
in what will become a privately owned company. 
1.2.2  The delisting decision on the Alternative Investment Market  
Gerakos (2013) compared the characteristics and performance of AIM companies with 
those traditionally regulated markets, such as the Main Market of LSE and NASDAQ in the US. 
The authors also analyzed the returns and liquidity of comparable companies. They focus on the 
influence of the nominated adviser, given that the AIM market provides regulatory flexibility 
and these adviser oversight firms in this market. The survival analysis focused on a cross-market 
comparison to discover, whether the established by the nominated adviser regulation in the AIM 
is better for firms than traditional regulation established by regulators and public institutions in 
other markets. Their findings show that AIM firms perform poorly on almost every dimension. 
Moreover, AIM companies are much more likely to fail than firms on other markets, supporting 
the idea that less strict regulation on the AIM damages these firms. 
Espenlaub (2012) developed a detailed survival analysis of all AIM IPOs, focusing on the 
reputation of nominated advisers because this reputation could be crucial in limiting 
informational problems and incentive conflicts. The AIM listed firms must maintain a nominated 
adviser at all times. It was found that the higher the nominated adviser’s reputation, the lower the 
probability of delisting, although company age, size, pre-IPO sales and insider ownership also 
reduce this probability. Therefore, the AIM has been called a reputational market, given that 
regulatory agents certify and control the quality of the listed firms (Mendoza 2008); (Espenlaub 
                                               
5 London Stock Exchange admission and disclosure standards. London Stock Exchange. Accessed January 
10, 2017. Retrieved from http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-
market/documents/admission-and-disclosure-standards.pdf. 
24 
 
2012). According to Espenlaub (2012), the role of nomads has been criticized after recent 
corporate scandals, as it appears some advisers fail in their duty to monitor firms. The authors 
also found that firms with more insider ownership have a longer survival period, in accordance 
with lower agency conflicts. They compare survivors to companies that delist because of a 
merger and acquisition or negative circumstances (liquidation or permanent suspension), but 
they do not include those firms that delist voluntarily (transfer to main market) or due to market 
regulation.  
Kashefi-Pour and Lasfer (2011, 2013) studied the impact of debt financing of AIM 
companies on the voluntary decision to go private. Their results of the research showed that 
firms with higher leverage, lower growth opportunities and lower capital expenditures are more 
likely to voluntarily delist from the AIM. For firms that are unable to raise equity capital and 
rebalance their leverage as public firms, the cost of maintaining their places on the AIM exceeds 
the benefit.  
Amini and Keasey (2013) analyzed the influence of a firm’s geographical proximity to 
London and its operating in the financial sector on IPO survival, and found that these aspects 
increase the probability of IPO failure on the AIM. 
1.2.3  The delisting decision on the Main markets 
Aslan and Kumar (2011) focus on both decisions, going public and private, for UK non-
financial and non-utilities firms in the AIM and Main market. They claim that managers may 
obtain private benefits from investing and managing large assets and that it is, therefore, costly to 
provide managerial incentives in those firms with dispersed ownership. Analyzing the period 
1996-2006, the authors found that low-visibility firms with high information costs, placed in 
underpriced industries and controlled by owners with private benefits of control, are more likely 
to go private. After going private, firms decrease investment, size, and sales growth, but increase 
profits, especially those firms bought out by private equity investors.  
Results of Aslan and Kumar (2011) support the view that firms that are economically 
underperforming due to agency conflicts between managers and dispersed shareholders. 
Companies are more likely to go private to improve efficiency through divesting value-reducing 
assets and reducing investment in negative net present value. Delisting may improve efficiency 
through the divestment of value-reducing assets and reduced investment in negative net present 
value in firms with agency conflicts between managers and dispersed shareholders. Therefore, 
they conclude that the most significant motivation for delisting is a reduction of the agency costs. 
(Marosi and Massoud (2007) and Leuz (2008) analyzed US firms on the Main Market 
and found that voluntarily delisting firms are smaller and have lower free cash flows than those 
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firms that go private. They argue that firms decide to delist by their own request when the costs 
of being public exceed the benefits. 
 Renneboog (2007) analyzed the decision to go private in the UK during the period 1997-
2003. The author found that shareholders obtain positive returns around the announcement of the 
delisting transaction through a Leverage Buyout (LBO), Management Buyout (MBO) or 
Management Buyin (MBI). The premium is determined by the tax benefits, incentive 
realignment and the undervaluation of the firm. They also show that the premium may vary 
depending on the ownership structure of the firm. Firms with higher levels of managerial 
ownership pay higher premiums. In contrast, the premium is lower in those firms held by outside 
shareholders, which is consistent with the greater managerial control in these firms.  
1.3  Involuntary delisting 
In this section, the aspects of involuntary delisting will be considered. Most empirical 
researches on this topic were conducted in the American market as the largest, most structured 
and regulated. Companies carry out compulsory delisting for two main reasons: they can either 
violate the stock exchange rules or show poor financial performance and experience financial 
distress. 
A number of studies have analyzed the consequences of non-compliance with the rules of 
the stock market for involuntary delisting in terms of its effectiveness with respect to both good 
financial indicators and protection of investors' rights. The criteria for excluding it from the 
American stock exchanges are very strict and well detailed. Sanger (1990) studied delisting 
companies from the New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange. The authors note 
that most delistings have occurred because of companies' failure to keep on track certain fixed 
values for financial indicators, such as minimum net income, number of shareholders or market 
value of shares. The authors also found that, in addition to the above, quantitative indicators and 
stock exchanges may also consider additional factors, such as a breach in accounting practices or 
ongoing conflicts of interest with creditors.  
Chen and Schoderbek (1999) analyzed the reasons for compulsory delisting on a sample 
of 150 companies excluded from the American Stock Exchange between 1981 and 1992. By 
focusing on accounting information, they noted that 45.7% of the excluded companies did not 
violate accounting standards before delisting, while 31% violated these guidelines several times 
within five years prior to delisting. Only 21.7% of companies within a year after their first 
violation of accounting standards were excluded. The authors suggested that American Stock 
Exchange does not base its decision to exclude companies on a strict compliance with market or 
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financial directives, because some firms may violate these guidelines without delisting. Thus, in 
the delisting process the following aspects are taken into account: 
1. The start of the bankruptcy procedure and/or litigation initiated by the 
shareholders. 
2. The volume of trades and/or stock returns. 
3. Opinion of the auditors. 
Serrano (2010) compared the rules of compulsory exclusion from the list of traded stocks 
in two different markets: on the New York Stock Exchange and Toronto Stock Exchange. In the 
New York Stock Exchange, delisting is a self-regulatory process, while on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange there is an external regulator who participates in the delisting solutions. The author 
argued that self-regulation in the New York Stock Exchange reinforces a corresponding conflict 
of interest in the event of delisting: more serious and costly consequences are expected for 
investors in companies that delisted from the New York Stock Exchange than for those who 
invest in companies excluded from the Toronto Stock Exchange. According to Serrano's 
findings, self-regulating stock markets create a sub-optimal trading environment due to 
contradictions in the performance of financial market standards, while on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange external regulators have less flexibility in applying the rules. Thus, firms on the New 
York Stock Exchange should have a wider spread in financial performance than on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange. These negative effects were strengthened after 2006, when the New York Stock 
Exchange became a public company. Serrano confirmed these assumptions on a sample of 198 
companies excluded from the New York Stock Exchange and 39 companies from the Toronto 
Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2009. 
1.4  Over-the-counter markets 
The situation when the company leaves the stock exchange, but this does not lead to a 
change of legal organizational form from public to private, is still less studied than the 
companies' decision to completely delist from the stock markets. Companies exclude their shares 
from the list of traded on the stock exchange and go to over-the-counter (OTC) markets, where 
their shares continue to be traded. Such a transition is called a "going dark decision". 
OTC markets are the decentralized trading mechanisms, in which each trader searches for 
the best counterpart through private, and usually bilateral, negotiations. There are many types of 
OTC markets that differ in such functions as, for example, the exact process, by which each 
trader looks for a buyer. Also, OTC markets differ in the presence of intermediate traders, such 
as brokers, or by the nature of the traded goods. There are two main features that characterize all 
over-the-counter markets. First, traders set prices themselves, and different sellers and buyers 
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can trade the same product at different prices. Thus, over-the-counter markets are not 
competitive markets. Secondly, OTC traders have less information than traders working in other 
non-competitive but more centralized markets.  
Despite the fact that the transition to over-the-counter markets is relatively fast and 
cheap, its result is similar to the decision of companies to complete delisting. Companies in their 
press releases most often use this advantage of leaving for OTC markets, like saving on a smaller 
or completely absent need for meeting the requirements of the securities commissions and 
regulators of the stock markets. After leaving for OTC markets, companies either have to write 
simplified financial statements, or do not have to publish annual, quarterly and any other types of 
reporting. The only requirement for companies is the minimum necessary trading conditions for 
the OTC market, where shares will be traded. Going to OTC markets allows the company at 
some stage to free itself from reporting obligations to investors, focus on long-term strategy and 
operations instead of fixing on short-term goals that can increase the cost of equity, but at the 
same time lower it in the long term. Nevertheless, there are various nuances and aspects that 
have been considered in some works.
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Marosi and Massoud (2007) and Leuz (2008) investigated the impact of Sarbanes–Oxley 
(SOX) Act of 2002 on delisting from stock markets. Sarbanes–Oxley Act is the new regulatory 
document, which determines the new procedures for all public companies. The impact of 
external control has already been confirmed in the work of Marosi and Massoud (2007). The 
authors found that companies that move to the OTC market have a greater share of insiders and a 
smaller share of institutional investors. They conducted a research on a sample of 261 US 
companies that delisted between 1996 and 2004. Comparing the periods before and after the 
adoption of the SOX law, they found that the number of companies that delisted after the 
adoption of the law increased significantly (101 companies carried out delisting in 2003 
compared to 44 in 2002). Their results are consistent with the assumption that the costs 
associated with compliance with the rules of the exchange and the maintenance of trades are the 
main factors determining the decision of delisting. 
The influence of SOX on the delisting decision is also confirmed in the work of Leuz 
(2008). Studying a sample of 480 companies that delisted from 1998 to 2004, the authors found 
that for smaller companies with not very high financial performance and low growth 
opportunities, the costs of meeting the requirements of the securities commission are particularly 
burdensome. As a consequence, such companies are most likely to switch to over-the-counter 
                                               
6 Going Dark, and Putting Blindfolds on Investors. The New York Times. Accessed February 20, 2017. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/business/securities-rules-can-leave-investors-in-the-
dark.html?_r=0. 
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markets. To examine the adequacy of company management and external control, various factors 
of corporate governance were examined, such as: the number (or share) of independent directors, 
the existence of an independent CEO and chairman, and institutional shareholders. They found 
that the companies that carried out delisting have weaker management of the board of directors 
and less qualitative external control. These companies also have, on average, large incurred but 
not yet paid expenses (which is directly related to lower quality of accounting) and more serious 
problems with free cash flow. Thus, US studies have shown that delisting can mitigate the 
agency problem and managerial opportunism.  
Therefore, during the process of studying both options of changing the organizational and 
legal form of activity, namely, full delisting and withdrawal to OTC markets, it can be concluded 
that within the framework of this work, attention will be focused on solving problems related to 
the identification of determinants in the case of full delisting. That is in the work the 
determinants of the companies’ complete transition from a public organizational legal form to a 
private one will be considered, studied, analyzed and used in the empirical study and interpreted. 
To understand the basics of the company's business process in the period before delisting, 
as well as during the exit from the stock market, the next section will consider the real cases of 
transition from a public to a private legal form. The study of the cases will allow to understand 
the internal motives of the company, which led to its final withdrawal from the stock market, and 
also to understand the existence of certain determinants of the delisting decision. 
1.5  Case Studies: Delistings of Daisy Group and JSC “Lebedyansky” 
Now two public-to-private transactions from London Stock Exchange and from the 
Russian Trading System Exchange will be reviewed. The theory behind the determinants of 
going-private transactions will be linked with the characteristics of the delisted companies. 
Moreover, the theoretical predictions will be analyzed on the real market examples. 
 
Purchase of Daisy Group Plc by the consortium led by the CEO of the company  
The company was founded by Matthew Riley in 2001. Daisy Communications Limited is 
a company that provides Internet and telecommunications services for small and medium-sized 
businesses. The company has grown rapidly due to the strategy of acquisition of competing 
companies in a similar sector. On July 1, 2009 the company Freedom4 Group Plc. announced the 
acquisition of Daisy Communications Limited, and subsequently the merged company was 
renamed to Daisy Group Plc. The company traded on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
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of the London Stock Exchange for five years from 2009.
7
 List of shareholders after the merger is 
presented in Table 1. In 2009, the total number of ordinary shares was 264 705 895. List of the 
shareholders before the delisting announcement is presented in Table 2. 
Table 1. List of shareholders after the merger. 
Shareholder Type Share 
Matthey Riley CEO 23.16% 
Invesco Perpetual Life 
Limited 
Independent Investment 
Manager 
16.21% 
Tosca Asset Management Asset manager 12% 
Eton Park Capital Limited Investment organization 9.57% 
Credit Suisse Group (Europe) 
Limited 
Bank 6.11% 
Gartmore 
Investment management 
business 
4.91% 
Schroders plc Asset manager 4.40% 
Capital Group of Companies 
Investment Management 
Organization 
3.91% 
Blackrock Inc Asset manager 3.42% 
Cazenove Capital 
Management Inc 
Investment Management 
Organization 
3.30% 
 Source: annual report of Daisy Group. 
 
Table 2. List of shareholders after the delisting announcement. 
Shareholder Type Share 
Toscafund Asset Management 
LLP 
Asset manager 28.52% 
Matthey Riley CEO 23.01% 
Invesco Limited 
Investment management 
company 
22.21% 
Host Europe (Bermuda) 
Limited 
Hosting provider 13.60% 
Woodford Investment 
Management 
Investment management 
company 
3.86% 
Daisy Group plc Employee 
Benefit Trust 
Employee Benefit Trust 3.41% 
Source: annual report of Daisy Group. 
 
In 2014 the company received a proposal from the consortium, which included 
Toscafund, Penta Capital and Matthew Riley, to sell the company for 185 pence per share, which 
                                               
7 Daisy Group: Yep, we're gonna eat you all up, Phoenix IT Group. The Register. Accessed February 22, 
2017. Retrieved from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/05/27/daisy_formal_offer_for_phoenix_it_group. 
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totaled 494 million pounds, with a premium of 26 pence (16.4%) to the closing price of the 
company's shares trading on July 25, 2014 (the last day of the offer from the consortium).
8
 
The Board of Directors consisted of six members: three were independent directors, and 
three were executive directors. Independent directors of the company considered this offer to buy 
out the shares to be honest and profitable, and similarly considered other holders of shares. The 
approval of the proposed transaction was received from 93.79% of the holders of shares, which 
under the laws of the UK (Squeeze-out Guide IBA Corporate and M&A Law Committee 2014) 
is sufficient for the repurchase of shares from minority shareholders. 
The consortium led by the company's CEO, initiated the purchase and subsequent 
delisting. The company Chain Bidco Plc, which was independently owned by the consortium 
Toscafund, Invesco Limited and Matthew Riley, was founded. Peter Dubens, chairman of the 
board of directors, noted that for the shareholders, this deal was profitable, since at the time of 
the circulation of shares on the London Stock Exchange, the original value per share was 80 
pounds. The company's value has grown from 200 million to 494 million pounds. Daisy Group 
was bought out at a multiplier of 11 EV/EBITDA, which brought a fairly large premium to 
shareholders. Thus, the company was bought by a consortium led by Matthew Riley, delisted 
through the management buyout and became private. 
Besides this, Matthew Riley, CEO of the company, said that the share price could have 
been significantly reduced if the company had decided to increase the debt burden to implement 
its business scheme and takeover other companies in the industry. With private sources of 
financing more widespread in 2014, the company saw the decision to become private more 
economically advantageous.
9
 The turnover by volume of shares dropped in 2014 almost by 40%, 
which was unacceptable for the company that wanted to increase more rapidly. 
In the case examined, the company carried out a full delisting procedure to achieve the 
objectives of the strategy. When deciding on delisting, the management of the company in the 
long term considered the need to create a business worth 1 billion UK pounds with a turnover of 
10 billion UK pounds. The company considered it necessary to achieve its goal through complete 
withdrawal from the stock market.
10
 
Therefore, in this case the delisting of the company initiated by the CEO and the funds 
forming the consortium was considered. The main conclusion of this case is that the key role in 
                                               
8 Recommended cash offer for Daisy Group plc by Chain Bidco plc. Penta Capital. Accessed February 22, 
2017. Retrieved from http://www.pentacapital.com/newsroom/cash-offer-daisy. 
9 Daisy Group chief to buy out company for £494m. The Telegraph. Accessed February 22, 2017. 
Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/11173619/Daisy-
Group-chief-to-buy-out-group-for-494m.html.  
10 Daisy accepts £500m investor buyout to take group private. Financial Times. Accessed February 22, 
2017. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/88994e62-5853-11e4-a31b-00144feab7de. 
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the delisting decision was played by the unified consortium led by the key figure in the company, 
namely the general director. The type of controlling shareholder in this case played an important 
role in the decision of delisting. In addition, it can be concluded that the concentration of 
ownership in the hands of a certain shareholder has an important role in deciding on the 
transition to a private legal organizational form. 
At the time of the delisting Daisy Group was almost seven times larger than the average 
company traded on AIM of London Stock Exchange (352 million pounds vs. 16 million pounds 
of net sales). In general, the smaller companies are expected to go private more often; however, 
delisting of Daisy Group was the opposite case. 
While analyzing the case, it should be mentioned that there was a certain type of 
shareholders, who owned a larger number of shares in the company. So, the controlling stake 
was owned by two funds, as well as the CEO of the company. It is worth noting that this aspect 
could play an important role in the company's decision to delist. For example, in the article 
written by Martinez and Serve (2011), the situation was considered when the driving factors for 
delisting differed depending on the type of large shareholders. So, for companies with a large 
share belonging to the family or fund, there were cases of withdrawal from the stock market. 
Moreover, in this paper the authors pointed that the liquidity is the primary benefit of 
going public. Therefore, if the liquidity associated with being listed deteriorates, firms will be 
more likely to go private. The turnover by volume of shares significantly dropped, which could 
influence the decision of the management to delist from the London Stock Exchange.  
One important advantage of public status is the easier access to equity markets. When a 
firm has a reduced need for external financing, there are fewer benefits associated with being 
listed, because there is no need to spend extra costs maintaining the trade of shares, and the 
shareholders could decide to bring the company private. Thus, firms that do not have large 
investments in both tangible and intangible assets or future growth opportunities are more likely 
to go private (Bharath and Dittmar 2010). Authors posited an inverse relationship between 
capital expenditures and the probability of delisting. The company in the observed case invested 
only 1% of its net sales on capital expenditures in 2014, less than the mean of 11% in the 
observed years.   
In addition, the company's board of directors owned more than 24% of the company's 
shares, primarily due to the fact that Matthey Riley's CEO owned 23%. In the study Weir et al. 
(2005) considered the situation when the greater the number of shares owned by the board of 
directors and institutional investors, the greater the probability of delisting. In this case, the board 
of directors owned 24% of the company's shares, and in total with shares of funds, the share 
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exceeded 60%, which correlates with the hypothesis of the study. In addition, the study noted 
that the fewer non-executive directors are on the board of directors, the greater the likelihood of 
delisting. The situation in this case contradicts the hypothesis of the authors of the study, since 
non-executive directors accounted for half of the company's board of directors. 
Moreover, the company’s operating performance is worse than the mean on the market 
(in 2013 EBITDA/Sales=0.13, while the mean on the market is 0.25). The hypothesis of 
Martinez et al. (2011) states that there is a negative relationship between the performance and the 
decision to go private, which is in line with the situation of Daisy Group. 
Achleitner (2013) analyzed a hypothesis that the company is unlikely to delist if it has an 
active shareholder exercising control. As in the company Daisy Group the general director 
owned a large share, but the company carried out delisting, this hypothesis is not confirmed in 
this case. 
 
Purchase of OJSC Lebedyansky by PepsiCo 
The IPO of OJSC Lebedyansky took place on March 11, 2005. List of shareholders 
before the IPO is presented in Table 3. Since the company was located as an OJSC, it can be 
assumed that the company has become a pseudo-public company. The total number of shares of 
the company was 20 411 300. The IPO prospectus was registered on January 25, 2005 and was 
prepared for inclusion in the quotation lists of the trades of shares of the company registered on 
April 30, 2004, placed among existing shareholders. Thus, the IPO offered a stake in the existing 
shareholders of the company. It can be noted that the existing shareholders only reduced the 
stake in the company, no one sold its entire package. List of shareholders after an IPO is 
presented in Table 4. In its statement on the IPO the company noted that the sale of shares to 
"Russian and foreign institutional investors" is assumed.
11
 
On February 14, 2005 the company entered into an agreement with "RTS Stock 
Exchange" on the listing of the company's shares. They were also placed on the MICEX. Road-
show was held from February 28 to March 10, 2005. Based on its results, the buy-back price was 
set at $37.23 per share (3% below the upper boundary of the corridor), and the offer size was 
increased from 3 347 454 shares (16.4% of the total) to 4 061 850 (19.9% of the total). As a 
result of the IPO, the company raised more than 151 million US dollars. The company's 
capitalization was 760 million US dollars. 
 
                                               
11 "Tonus" for the stock exchange. "Lebedyansky" told about the forthcoming IPO. Sostav.ru. Accessed 
February 22, 2017. Retrieved from http://www.sostav.ru/news/2005/02/16/700/. 
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Table 3. List of shareholders before the IPO. 
Shareholder Position Share 
Nikolay I. Bortsov Ex-director of Lebedyansky, a 
State Duma deputy from the 
Lipetsk single-mandate 
electoral district 
35% (shares transferred to the 
trust management of LLC 
"Leasing Company" Juris")
12
 
Yury N. Bortsov Previously, he was the first 
deputy general director of the 
company, at the end of 2004 
he was chairman of the board 
of directors 
32% 
Olga A. Belyavtseva The deputy general director of 
the plant and the executive 
director of his distributor LLC 
"Company Assol" 
19.9% 
Konstantin An. Voloshin Purchasing Director 10.1% 
Dmitry An. Fadeev Deputy Chairman of the Board 
of Directors 
3% 
Source: SKRIN. 
Table 4. List of shareholders after an IPO: 
Shareholder Position Share 
Nikolay I. Bortsov Ex-director of Lebedyansky, a 
State Duma deputy from the 
Lipetsk single-mandate 
electoral district 
30% (shares transferred to the 
trust management of LLC 
"Leasing Company" Juris") 
Yury N. Bortsov Chairman of the board of 
directors 
25.13% 
Olga A. Belyavtseva The deputy general director of 
the plant and the executive 
director of his distributor LLC 
"Company Assol" 
18.4% 
Konstantin An. Voloshin Purchasing Director 3.2% 
Dmitry An. Fadeev Deputy Chairman of the 
Board of Directors 
2.77% 
Source: SKRIN. 
 
It can be assumed that the shareholders considered the money raised by the IPO as the 
basis of personal welfare.
13
 This was confirmed later by the director of public relations 
"Lebedyansky", saying that the shareholders "needed to capitalize on the achievements".
14
 This 
                                               
12 The transfer of government securities to trust management may become mandatory only in cases of 
conflict of interest or the likelihood of its occurrence. Garant.ru. Accessed February 23, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.garant.ru/news/525333/. 
13 The market will drink all the juices. Expert Online. Accessed February 25, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://expert.ru/expert/2005/11/11ex-ipolebe_4926/. 
14 IPO is out of fashion. Expert Online. Accessed February 22, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://expert.ru/expert/2006/39/ipo_vyhoduat_iz_mody/. 
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goal of the IPO is logical for companies operating in stagnant industries, which was the industry 
of juice production in Russia at that time. 
In the subsequent IPO years the company's revenue fell, and in 2007 it fell by 10% 
according to IFRS. The expansion and access to regional markets did not yield significant 
returns. With the increase in revenue, the net profit fell.
15
 
On March 20, 2008, PepsiCo announced the purchase of a division of the company 
engaged in the production of juices of OJSC Lebedyansky. For PepsiCo this transaction was the 
only way to increase its market share in the production of juice in Russia from 2% to more than 
30%. The results of Lebedyansky activities in 2007 turned out to be worse than the analysts were 
waiting for, and, moreover, the company's juice production line began to develop more slowly 
than the direction of baby food and mineral waters. Thus, this transaction helped PepsiCo to 
become a serious player in the Russian juice market, and Lebedyansky - to focus on a more 
profitable direction.
16
 
Prior to the delisting the list of shareholders was the following as presented in Table 5
17
: 
Table 5. List of shareholders before the delisting. 
Shareholder Position Share 
Nikolay I. Bortsov Ex-director of Lebedyansky, a 
State Duma deputy from the 
Lipetsk single-mandate 
electoral district 
30% (shares transferred to the 
trust management of LLC 
"Leasing Company" Juris") 
Yury N. Bortsov Chairman of the board of 
directors 
25.13% 
Olga A. Belyavtseva The deputy general director of 
the plant and the executive 
director of his distributor LLC 
"Company Assol" 
18.4% 
Dmitry An. Fadeev Deputy Chairman of the 
Board of Directors 
2% 
Management of the company  0.6% 
Stocks on MICEX and RTS  23.87% 
Source: SKRIN. 
 
For the transaction, PepsiCo and Pepsi Bottling Company established a joint venture LLC 
Lebedyansky Holdings – 58.33% PepsiCo (through Pepsi-Cola (Bermuda) Ltd.18) and 41.67% 
                                               
15 PepsiCo and PBG intend to increase the stake in JSC Lebedyansky to 100%, after which delisting of 
shares is not excluded. RBC. Accessed February 25, 2017. Retrieved from 
https://quote.rbc.ru/news/company/20/03/2008/58c6c2159a79470e32a32e78. 
16 Lebedyansky poured off all the juices. Expert Online. Accessed February 25, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://expert.ru/expert/2008/12/lebedyanskiy_slil_soki/. 
17 A cheap deal. Vedomosti. Accessed February 23, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2008/04/01/kopeechnaya-sdelka. 
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Pepsi Bottling Company (through PepsiCo Holdings). The purchase of shares in OJSC 
Lebedyansky took place through this new joint venture. To delist the company under the law of 
the Russian Federation, PepsiCo must have a minimum of 95% of shares.
19
 
August 29, 2008 PepsiCo and Pepsi Bottling Group (PBG) completed the acquisition of 
75.53% of the shares of the Lebedyansky juice production unit, paying 1.4 billion dollars (88.02 
dollars per share) for this stake. Analysts considered this proposal to be very generous: the 
companies of the soft drinks industry were trading at the time at a ratio of 10 EV/EBITDA, while 
Lebedyansky was sold at a multiplier of 17 EV/EBITDA, which meant a fairly large premium to 
shareholders.
20
 In addition, the market capitalization of the entire company was 1.7 billion 
dollars at that time, while buyers estimated only its late division of juice production at 1.8 billion 
dollars. PBG President and CEO Eric Foss in the interview stated that the buyer companies 
consider the price to be fair, as they buy valuable assets: both tangible and valuable brands and 
talented management personnel.
21
 
In September 2008, LLC Lebedyansky Holdings owned 81.1% of shares of OJSC 
Lebedyansky. At the same time, the company made an offer to minority shareholders of OJSC 
Lebedyansky to buy back 18.99% of shares by 8.4 billion rubles at the rate of 2 165 thousand 
rubles per share (85.33 dollars).
22,23 
It should be noted that the price of buyout for minority 
shareholders was slightly lower than for majority shareholders. The potential premium for 
minority shareholders ranged from 18 to 30%.
24
 
As a result, Lebedyansky Holdings LLC became the holder of 98.11818% of shares of 
OJSC Lebedyansky. After that, in January 2009 the company made a buyout of the remaining 
shares at the price of the September offer. As of November 10, 2009, Lebedyansky Holdings 
LLC has increased its stake in JSC Lebedyansky to 100%. 
                                                                                                                                                       
18 PepsiCo & CocaCola: neck and neck in Russia's juice market. Marchmont. Accessed February 23, 2017. 
Retrieved from http://marchmontnews.com/News/Features/3640-PepsiCo--CocaCola-neck-and-neck-Russias-juice-
market.html. 
19 PepsiCo will drink all the juices from "Lebedyansky". Kommersant.ru. Accessed February 25, 2017. 
Retrieved from http://kommersant.ru/doc/869503. 
20 "Alfa-Bank": "Lebedyansky" announced a buyout by PepsiCo. RBC. Accessed February 28, 2017. 
Retrieved from https://quote.rbc.ru/news/20/03/2008/58b6eb109a794733033ad105. 
21 Interview: PBG President and CEO Erik Foss. Sostav.ru. Accessed February 28, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.sostav.ru/articles/2008/07/21/ko2/. 
22
 PepsiCo has issued an offer to minority shareholders of the Lebedyansky. Mergers.ru. Accessed 
February 28, 2017. Retrieved from http://mergers.ru/news/PepsiCo-vystavilo-ofertu-minoritariyam-JeKZ-
Lebedyanskij-10233. 
23Commentary of BCS analyst. The price of the PepsiCo offer to the shareholders of Lebedyansky was 
2165 rubles. BKS Express. Accessed February 28, 2017. Retrieved from http://bcs-express.ru/novosti-i-
analitika/kommentariy-analitika-bks.-cena-oferty-pepsico-k-akcioneram-lebedyanskogo-sostavila-2165-rub. 
24 Minorities poured off most of the juices. Kommersant.ru. Accessed February 28, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1095475. 
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In January 2009, the company's shares have been excluded from the "Quotation List B" 
and were included in the section "Unlisted securities on RTS and MICEX”.25 At the beginning of 
March 2009 there were stopped tradings of the shares of JSC Lebedyansky on RTS and were 
finally suspended trading on the MICEX stock Exchange.
26
 PepsiCo and PBG have stated the 
intention to delist from the beginning of the negotiations and after the acquisition of a stake in 
75.53% in May 2009. The representative of the bank-organizer of the deal said that "the public 
company with the maintenance of the listing, accounting and requiring organizational and 
monetary expenses is not needed”. OJSC Lebedyansky ceased to disclose information in 
February 2011, after the satisfaction of the FSFM of the corresponding application by the 
company. The company changed its organizational and legal form of a company on February 1, 
2012. 
The ownership hierarchy of Lebedyansky Holdings LLC currently has the following view 
(see Table 6): 
Table 6. The ownership structure of Lebedyansky Holdings LLC. 
Name Location 
Hierarchy 
level 
Share of 
direct 
ownership*, 
% 
Share of 
implied 
ownership, % 
LLC Lebedyansky 
Holdings 
Russia 1.00 100 — 
Frito Lay 
Manufacturing llc 
Russia 2.00 58,33 58.33 
SVE Russia Holdings 
GmbH 
Germany 3.00 100 58.33 
Donon Holdings limited Cyprus 4.00 50 — 
PepsiCo Holdings, LLC Russia 2.00 41.67 41.67 
Pepsi Bottling Group 
GmbH 
Germany 3.00 99 41.25 
Prb Luxembourg 
International SARL 
Luxembourg 4.00 50 — 
Pr Beverages Cyprus 
(Russia) Holding 
limited 
Cyprus 5.00 50 — 
Pepsico, Inc. USA 6.00 50 — 
Source: SPARK. 
* The share of direct ownership of the authorized capital of the company, which is at the previous level in 
the hierarchical chain. If the share is not exactly known, the range in which it is located is indicated, in which case a 
further calculation of the share of indirect ownership of the company becomes impossible. 
 
                                               
25 JSC "Lebedyansky". Interfax Disclosure. Accessed February 28, 2017. Retrieved from http://www.e-
disclosure.ru/Index.aspx?eventid=282AV4D3vUSq8KYBmoPFzQ-B-B. 
26 Lebedyansky, common stock. Investfunds. Accessed March 25, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://stocks.investfunds.ru/stocks/247/. 
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Thus, in this case the situation of the buyout of the company and withdrawal from the 
stock market was considered. It is worth noting that this situation occurred in the developing 
market and during the crisis of 2008. The main conclusion that can be drawn is the fact that more 
than 75% of the shares belonged to individuals holding key positions in the company, and this 
influenced the decision to sell the company. JSC Lebedyansky was primarily a family company, 
since the controlling stake was owned by the Bortsov family, which most likely also played a 
role in the delisting decision. Therefore, the shareholders had sufficient strength to initiate the 
delisting through sale. The Bortsov family decided to conduct the IPO to capitalize their 
achievements. It is logical that, having received the proposal, which represented a significant 
award, the owners of the company agreed to sell it. 
The successful financial results did not change the attitude of the management of the 
company to the delisting decision. The company invested about 23% of its sales on capital 
expenditure in 2006 and kept on increasing investments till the delisting. This aspect is opposite 
to the situation described by Martinez et al. (2010) that there is a negative relationship between 
the ratio of capital expenditures to sales and the decision to go private. 
Moreover, operating performance of the company was steadily increasing from 2005 and 
showed 0.34 of EBITDA/Sales, which is a very good result for the leader of the industry. This is 
opposite to the hypothesis of Martinez that the increase in operating performance leads to the 
less probability of the delisting. 
The company's board of directors lacked non-executive directors, and the chairman and 
deputy chairman of the board of directors owned a large stake. This situation was considered by 
Weir (2005). In addition, in this study, the authors investigated the hypothesis that delisted 
companies were more attractive for takeover (rather than another form of delisting) than 
companies remaining in the stock market, which corresponds to the situation from the above 
case. 
Perhaps the owners of the company felt that their company is undervalued, since the fact 
that the company was sold for a much higher cost says that it is worth paying attention to (Sales 
ratio 17 EV/EBITDA, while the average market multiplier was 10 EV/EBITDA). Indeed, this 
situation was considered by the authors of various studies (Martinez and Serve 2011), 
(Renneboog 2007). 
Summary 
Analysis of the cases showed that companies traded on different stock exchanges and 
operated on different types of markets had both similar and different causes and results that 
affected the decision to switch from public to private legal organizational form. 
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In both cases, a large amount of shares belonged to a certain type of shareholders who 
directly took decisions, on which the further development of the company depended. In the first 
case, the delisting process was initiated by the company's CEO, who was supported by funds that 
owned large parts of shares. In the second case, the family company was acquired by a 
transnational corporation with a very high premium during the company's stagnation. 
However, the situation of operating performance is similar for both companies. Previous 
researches assume that the lowering or poor operating performance leads to a delisting. In both 
cases the companies had increasing operating indicators and were among the leaders of the 
industries. Despite this fact, both of the companies delisted at the peak of its operating 
performance measures. 
The contradictory situation is linked with the ratio of capital expenditures. Daisy Group 
invested only 1% of its sales, while the mean for the market was about 13%. The opposite 
situation was with Lebedyansky. The company invested almost 23%, however, it also delisted.  
In addition, the company Lebedyansky took expert estimates of about 30% of juice 
production in the market, as well as the 6th largest juice producer in the world
27
, while the 
company Daisy Group by the standards of the telecommunications market in the UK took a 
much smaller share. Perhaps the issue of the size of the company played a role in the decision on 
delisting because of the direct costs of maintaining the listing. 
1.6  Hypotheses Formulation 
The determinants of the going private decision are observed from the point of two 
different categories: the operational performance of the companies and the results of activity on 
the stock exchange. 
To study the main question of this study more precisely, to identify the determinants of 
the companies' decision to move to a private organizational and legal form, the following 
hypotheses were selected: 
Hypothesis 1 (Access to capital): There is a negative relationship between the ratio of 
capital expenditures to sales and the decision to go private. 
 One major benefit of having public status is the easier access to equity markets (Lasfer 
and Kashefi 2013). Consistent with this argument, when a firm has a reduced need for external 
financing, there are fewer benefits associated with being listed, and the majority shareholders 
could decide to bring the company private.  
                                               
27 Buying the company Multon and the brand Rich, Coca-Cola is trying to save the situation on the Russian 
juice market, analysts say. RBC. Accessed March 25, 2017. Retrieved from 
https://quote.rbc.ru/news/company/15/03/2005/58c6c1e89a79470e32a3183f. 
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The opportunity to tap public markets for equity capital is appealing for high growth 
firms with large current and future investments that may have limited access to other financing 
alternatives due to high leverage or high transactions costs and is a leading reason why firms go 
public (Weisbach and Kim 2008). Thus, firms that do not have large investments or future 
growth opportunities are more likely to go private (Bharath and Dittmar 2010).  
Hypothesis 2 (Performance): There is a negative relationship between the performance 
and the decision to go private. 
According to Leuz (2008), many firms go dark because managers want to conceal poor 
future prospects and/or financial distress. The likelihood that a firm will go private should 
increase with poor performance. Thomsen (2007) argued that inefficient firms may be more 
likely to be delisted either because they go bankrupt, or because they want to restructure. Thus, 
in this study it is posited that firms with weak performance will choose to go private because the 
risk of bankruptcy increases financial distress costs. In such a case, the firm cannot afford listing 
status or amortize previous listing costs. 
Hypothesis 3 (Growth prospects): There is a negative relationship between firm’s growth 
prospects and the decision to go private. 
Jensen’s argument about the importance of free cash flow is also linked to growth 
opportunities (Jensen 1986). Firms with low growth opportunities may spend the cash on 
negative net present value projects because there are limited opportunities for profitable 
investment within the firm’s areas of operation. A number of studies have used different  
measures of growth opportunities. For example, sales growth was found to be significantly lower 
for firms going private by Lehn and Poulsen (1989). However, Opler (1993) and Halpern (1999) 
found no evidence that Tobin’s Q is lower for firms going private. In the thesis it is assumed that 
firms are more likely to go private if they are characterized by lower growth prospects.  
Hypothesis 4 (Liquidity of Shares): There is a negative relationship between stock 
liquidity and the decision to go private.  
 Amihud (1998), Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) and Boot, Gopalan and Thalor (2006) 
in their papers found a liquidity of share trading to be a primary benefit of going public. As a 
consequence, if the liquidity benefit associated with being listing deteriorates, firms will be more 
likely to go private. Further, share trading on an exchange is cheaper compared to bilateral 
trades, and this liquidity benefit (which is an increasing function of the trading volume) leads 
companies to go public.  
Therefore, it is hypothesized that there is an inverse relationship between stock liquidity 
and the probability of voluntary delisting. Based on the theoretical implications of the models, 
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liquidity is, therefore, a benefit to being a public firm that is considered in the choice between 
public and private ownership.  
In addition to the Hypothesis 4 described above, the following situations of 
undervaluation, agency problem, crisis years and direct listing costs will be studied in this paper. 
Element related to the more traditional explanations for going private is a free cash flow. 
First, free cash flows are cash balances in excess of what is required to fund projects with 
positive net present values (Jensen 1986). Firms with high free cash flows, therefore, incur high 
agency costs because the funds could be returned to shareholders in the form of higher dividends 
or used to repurchase stock, which again increases returns to shareholders. Evidence about the 
role of free cash flow in the decision to go private is mixed. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) find 
evidence that firms going private had higher free cash flows whereas Opler (1993) reported an 
insignificant relationship. 
During the crisis years companies face a difficult situation due to tough and unstable 
market conditions. The main purpose of the companies is to survive and overcome the 
difficulties imposed by the environment. Therefore, companies cannot afford extra costs of 
public status and are more likely to go private during difficult years.  
Four categories of costs are incurred by public firms: 
1. Fixed costs following IPOs, including annual listing fees (imposed by exchanges 
and regulatory bodies), trading costs (i.e. brokerage fees) and information 
production costs (i.e. audit and publication costs related to disclosure). 
2. Compliance costs to meet regulatory and corporate governance standards. 
3. Indirect costs related to the firms’ undervaluation. 
4. Financial distress costs due to poor performance. 
Kim and Lyn (1991) investigated the size of the company. In any public company, there 
are operating costs, such as those associated with offering a large buyout price in the delisting 
process, and with the need to offer minority shareholders – a decent price, so that the veto to 
affect a deal is not used. These costs are likely to increase with the size of the firm and the 
number of shareholders. In addition, the degree of asymmetry of information, and therefore the 
underestimation of the value of the company is likely to be related to the size of the firm. For 
example, Verrechia (1984) and Buzby (1975) proved that the degree of disclosure of financial 
information has a positive relationship with the size of the firm. That is, the larger the company, 
the more expensive the process of disclosing financial information.  
Martinez and Serve (2011) followed similar results. In their work, they noted the results 
of DeAngelo (1984), according to which the listing generates annual expenses through 
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registration, bidding and other costs of servicing the stockholders. Since large firms may be more 
efficient at amortizing these fixed costs, most likely small businesses will be more motivated to 
implement delisting when the direct costs of maintaining the listing increase.  
Managers and owners of the company can have richer and more reliable insider 
information than the potential investors. Investors can only estimate the value of the company 
and cannot know the true value of the company. It is possible that management, which has 
superior inside information and knows the true distribution of future returns, realizes that the 
share price is undervalued in relation to the true potential of the firm. Ventoruzzo (2010) argued 
that delisting will occur when market prices do not fully reflect the real value of a firm. Under 
such circumstances, the reduction of the cost of capital may not compensate the costs of staying 
public. Hence, undervaluation will create an incentive for a firm to exit the public market. In this 
case, the objectives of controlling shareholders and managers would be to hide the real value of 
the firm and avoid opportunity costs (i.e. adverse selection costs) related to undervaluation.  
 
Testing the abovementioned hypotheses would allow drawing conclusions, whether the 
following aspects in Figure 2 serve as determinants for the decision to go private: 
 
Figure 2. Determinants for the decision to go private. Source: created by the author. 
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CHAPTER 2. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
2.1  Research Design 
Statistical and econometrical analysis is used in this master thesis. According to the 
analysis of the modern and most relevant empirical researches, these instruments are the most 
adequate for answering the main research question.  
In the latest researches authors started using the survival models (mostly Cox 
proportional hazard model), which in economic studies are called duration models. This model 
shows good results of establishing the determinants of the going private decision by the 
company. Bharath and Dittmar (2010) used a Cox proportional hazard model, which determined 
the hazard (probability) a firm would go private given its initial firm characteristics and their 
evolution over time, relative to other firms. In doing so, authors revealed many novel insights 
into why firms go private and shed light on the relevant costs and benefits of being a public firm. 
Kashefi-Pour and Lasfer (2011) used Cox model to investigate the determinants of the delisting 
decision. 
Therefore, the technique chosen for this master thesis is Cox proportional hazard model. 
This model takes into account the observation of the companies’ decision-making process during 
the whole process of its listing on the stock exchange. In this model any public firm is studied as 
a subject to binary outcome at the end of each year: it is either delisted or not. 
Survival analysis takes into account the fact that each company has its own IPO date and 
entry time into the study. The fact that the follow-up period varies across companies is therefore 
not a problem. Further, if company does not delist during the study period, then the last follow-
up time is recorded and the data is considered right-censored, unlike in logit model. Survival 
analysis techniques are specifically designed to properly handle censoring.  
Survival model, unlike logit/probit model allows not to lose important information 
contained in year-to-year outcomes. In logit/probit models the results will be optimal when the 
number of delisted companies will be as close as possible to the number of companies stayed 
public. Due to the fact that there are in reality more companies that stayed public and did not 
delist, the logit/probit model limits the number of companies included in the sample. This 
situation is not a problem for the Cox proportional hazard model, as the results are handled by 
software in a proper way even if the number of public companies is not equal to gone private 
companies. Moreover, Cox model is preferred to a logistic model, since the latter one ignores 
survival time and censoring information. 
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So, Cox model is very useful for determining the factors which are related to the 
companies’ decision to go private. 
Hazard rate in this model is a conditional probability of a firm being delisted in a given 
year (given that it did not do so in the previous years). Thus, hazard rate is an independent 
variable in Cox proportional hazard model. The model itself looks as follows: 
hi(t) = h0(t)exp⁡(β1Xi1 + βi2Xi2 +⋯+ βnXin), 
Where h0(t) is the baseline hazard. If all covariates (Xin) are equal to zero, then the 
interpretation of the baseline hazard is thus the hazard of a company. It is estimated from the 
data. 
β1, β2, … , βp are regression parameters estimated by the model; 
Xi1, Xi2, … , Xin is the covariate value for covariate 1 for company I; 
Time t is the duration of the company on a stock exchange in year t. 
The hazard rate will be calculated automatically by statistic package Stata upon entering 
the following inputs: 
 Binary variable, which is equal to 1, if company went private, 0 – if did not. 
 Duration – number of time periods passed from the beginning of the study. 
In this case binary variable will take on a value 1 if a firm went private or 0 if it stayed 
public. Duration is measured in years and for each observation it will equal the number of years 
passed since the beginning of the study (in this thesis the data is collected on firms beginning 
2005). Mathematically, hazard ratio at the beginning of some year t will be equal to the number 
of firms that were delisted in year t divided by the number of public firms at the start of year t: 
hazard⁡ratio =
number⁡of⁡firms⁡that⁡delisted⁡in⁡year⁡t⁡
number⁡of⁡public⁡firms⁡at⁡the⁡start⁡of⁡year⁡t
 
The coefficients (βs) and hazard ratios are estimated using statistical software Stata, 
which will estimate them using maximum likelihood. 
The Cox regression estimates the coefficient vector beta. The Cox proportional hazard 
model does not impose any restriction on h0(t), the baseline hazard. Cox's partial likelihood 
estimator provides a way of estimating β without estimating h0(t). A positive coefficient on 
variable x in the hazard model implies that a higher x is linked to higher hazard rate and thus a 
lower expected duration. The hazard ratio, which is simply 𝑒𝛽, tells how much the hazard (i.e. 
instantaneous risk) the going private event increases for a unit change in the independent 
variable. In simple terms, a 1 unit increase of 𝑥𝑗 leads to an increase in linear combination of 𝑥
′𝛽 
on coefficient 𝛽𝑗 and an increase of risk function in every point 𝑡 in 𝑒
𝛽𝑗  times (Ratnikova and 
Furmanov 2014): 
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𝑒𝛽𝑗 =
ℎ0(𝑡)exp⁡(𝑥
′𝛽 + 𝛽𝑗)
ℎ0(𝑡)exp⁡(𝑥′𝛽)
 
More specifically, results of the Cox proportional hazard model have the following 
interpretation presented in Table 7. A positive coefficient implies hazard rate greater than 1, 
which means lower duration for the going private transaction and higher risk for the event to 
happen. Negative coefficient implies hazard rate from 0 to 1, which means higher duration for 
the going private transaction and lower risk for the event to happen. 
Table 7. Interpretation of coefficients and hazard rates in Cox model. 
Coefficient Hazard rate Interpretation 
Positive >1 
Lower duration for the delisting, higher hazard rates (more 
likely for the event to happen) 
Negative (0,1) 
Higher duration for the delisting, lower hazard rates (less likely 
for the event to happen) 
Source: created by the author. 
 
Cox regression is the prediction of risk of the event occurrence for the object under 
consideration and the assessment of the influence of predetermined independent variables 
(predictors) on this risk. Risk is considered as a function of time. The object (observation) is a 
company, for which the risk of an event is projected. This object is under surveillance and 
therefore is at risk: at any time, an event may occur with it, in which case it is eliminated from 
the risk group. The companies delisting is considered as an event.  
Moreover, in order to check the consistency of the results of Cox proportional hazard 
model the three parametric models are used: 
1. Exponential model. 
2. Weibull model. 
3. Gompertz model.  
Parametric models can assume different parametric forms for the hazard function, 
presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Parametric models functions 
Parametric model Hazard function 𝒉(𝒕|𝒙) Survival function 𝑺(𝒕|𝒙) 
Exponential exp⁡(𝑥′𝛽) exp⁡(−𝑡 exp(𝑥′𝛽)) 
Weibull 𝑝𝑡𝑝−1exp⁡(𝑥′𝛽) exp⁡(−exp(𝑥′𝛽) 𝑡𝑝) 
Gompertz exp⁡(𝛾𝑡 + 𝑥′𝛽) exp⁡(−𝛾−1exp⁡(𝑥′𝛽)(exp(𝛾𝑡) − 1) 
Source: created by the author. 
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Independent Variables Description 
First of all, a ratio of Capital Expenditures to net sales (CAPEX_Sales) was included in 
the model. This measure controls the capital market access for the companies. This variable 
describes the activity of the company in terms of investments in property, plant and equipment 
and machinery. Low ratio might mean that access to capital is less important for a company and 
that it would more likely go private. It is assumed that for firms that do not have large 
investments or future growth opportunities the delisting is more likely to happen. Therefore, it is 
expected to have a negative relationship between the variable and the conditional probability of a 
firm being delisted. 
Secondly, the variable OpPerf was also included to control the operating performance of 
the company. The poor future prospects and/or financial distress can motivate the managers of 
the company to go private in order to hide poor financial results. Moreover, Thomsen and Vinten 
(2007) argued that inefficient firms may be more likely to be delisted, either because they go 
bankrupt, or because they become a target for restructuring. Thus, it is posited that firms with 
weak performance will choose to go private because the risk of bankruptcy increases financial 
distress costs. In such a case, the firm cannot afford listing status or amortize previous listing 
costs. The variable is defined as EBITDA divided by Total Assets. It is composed of Asset 
Turnover multiplied by Operating Margin.  
The EBITDA Return on Assets ratio measures the amount of EBITDA profit generated in 
comparison to total assets. This ratio measures how efficiently a company is generating 
EBITDA. This means capital structure, different tax rates, and different CAPEX costs would not 
affect comparisons between companies. The higher the EBITDA Return on Assets percentage, 
the greater the ratio of EBITDA profit to the company’s total assets. Therefore, a negative 
relationship between this ratio and the conditional probability to go private is assumed. 
Thirdly, sales growth opportunities are included in the model with a variable SalGr. A 
number of studies have used different measures of growth opportunities. For example, sales 
growth was found to be significantly lower for firms going private by Lehn and Poulsen (1989). 
However, Opler (1993) and Halpern (1999) found no evidence that Tobin’s Q is lower for firms 
going private. In this master thesis the variable is measured by ((Current⁡Year′s⁡Net⁡Sales/
Net⁡Sales⁡four⁡years⁡ago, reduced⁡to⁡a⁡compound⁡annual⁡rate)⁡– ⁡1) ⁡∗ ⁡100 and the negative 
relationship between this variable and the conditional probability of going private is assumed. 
Another variable included in the model is the log of average annual number of 
transactions with shares (turnover by volume). The previous research studies by Amihud (1998) 
and Boot, Gopalan and Thalor (2006) show that liquidity of share trading is a primary benefit of 
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going public. Thus, when this benefit deteriorates, the likelihood of a firm going private 
increases and the negative relationship between turnover by volume and conditional probability 
of being delisted is expected. 
The decision to go private was driven by a perception that the market had not accurately 
valued the companies in terms of their share prices. An important theme running through the 
comments made about the perceived undervaluation is that it had occurred over a period of time 
and was expected to persist. Undervaluation may, therefore, be defined in terms of the 
deterioration of the company’s share price relative to firms remaining public. This will, 
therefore, hamper management’s ability to use the expected benefits available to quoted 
companies. Its main consequence is the very limited access to the funds required to finance 
either expansion or acquisitions. The price-to-book ratio (which is equal to share price divided 
by book value per share) was included as a proxy for undervaluation and undervalued companies 
are assumed to exit the public market.  
In case of large undistributed free cash flow, conflicts between shareholders and 
managers may take place. This happens because the presence of high free cash flows may give 
managers a possibility to spend cash on unprofitable and low potential projects. Therefore, the 
going private transaction consolidates the ownership and management. Hence, companies with 
large amount of undistributed free cash flows are more likely to go private and a positive 
relationship between FCF and the conditional probability of going private is expected. Free Cash 
Flow (FCFrat) represents the cash earnings net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid 
of the company, for the 12 months ended, divided by net sales. 
Further, a variable describing the firm size is included in the model. The variable LnSales 
is equal to the natural logarithm of Net sales or Revenues (gross sales and other operating 
revenue less discounts, returns and allowances). Firm size measures how the company is able to 
maintain public status through amortizing fixed costs of the listing procedure. That is, the larger 
the company, the more expensive the process of disclosing financial information but the 
company is better at amortizing these fixed costs. 
Crisis: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 from 2007 to 2008 and zero otherwise 
(2005-2007, 2009-2016). The crisis period creates more financial constraints and more 
difficulties for firms. Raising the funds needed for a buyout becomes extremely difficult, which 
negatively affects the probability of a voluntary delisting (Croci 2014). 
The list of independent variables with their description (formulas for computation) and 
expected sign is provided in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Description of the independent variables. 
Variable Description Sign 
CAPEX_Sales Capital Expenditures/Sales - 
OpPerf EBITDA/Total Assets = (EBITDA/Net Sales) * 
(Net Sales/Total Assets) 
- 
SalGr ((Current Year's Net Sales/Net Sales four years 
ago, reduced to a compound annual rate) – 1) * 100 
- 
Liq Log of Annual number of Transactions (Turnover 
by Volume) 
- 
PB Share Price/Book Value per Share - 
FCFrat Free Cash Flow/Sales + 
LnSales Log Sales - 
Crisis Dummy variable. 1 – if 2007 or 2008 years, 0 - 
otherwise 
No direction 
of relationship 
Source: created by the author. 
2.2  Sampling and Data Collection 
The majority of the studies examining the decision to go private include companies 
delisted mostly from the US stock exchanges in the sample. However, the access to the statistics 
of the listings on the American stock exchanges is rather limited. It requires a special access to 
the databases and can be obtained only with the permission of the stock exchange.  
Moreover, the data on the delistings is not published by any stock exchange. Most of the 
stock exchanges provide information for the listing companies, while the data for the going 
private transactions is very limited. The collection of the representative sample from stock 
exchanges of the US by searching and analyzing the relevant news about delisting is very 
complex due to the large amount of information. Analyzing the different statistical resources of 
the most well-known stock exchanges of Europe, it was decided to concentrate on the companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange due to its size and the availability of the published 
information. It should be mentioned that in this research only voluntary going private 
transactions are studied. Thus, in the final sample only the companies that went private 
voluntarily were included. 
 
Company Data Selection 
2.2.1 Alternative Investment Market 
The list of traded companies on the London Stock Exchange was obtained from the 
exchange’s official statistical web-page. Companies that were listed at some point between 2005 
and 2016 were selected for this study. Initially the total number of companies on the AIM was 
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1555 of which 787 have already delisted from 2005 and 768 were still listing on the stock 
exchange. The data for independent variables was taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream, 
Thomson Reuters Eikon databases and annual reports of the companies. 
The total number of firm-years observations was almost 19000. Some of the companies 
dropped out of the sample because for some of the individual variables there were missing data. 
If the data for any of the variables was impossible to collect, companies were excluded from the 
sample. Firm-year observations, for which the data was absent for at least one of the years, were 
excluded from the sample. After that the companies, which went private in order to transfer from 
AIM to Main Market of the London Stock Exchange, and investment trusts companies were 
excluded. Some of the companies published their annual report even after the delisting 
transaction. Therefore, such figures were excluded from the model, because the data from such 
reports cannot have predictive power over what had already happened.  
In the end, the final sample contained 4768 firm-year observations representing 613 
unique firms of which 285 delisted and 328 were still public by the end of 2016. These 
companies perform in different industries. The Figure 3 represents the distribution of the 
companies across industries. 24% of these companies represent industrials (according to Industry 
Classification Benchmark)
28
, 19% of the companies represent the technology industry, 16% of 
the companies work operate in consumer services industry, 13% of the companies are from 
financial industry, 9% of the companies are from healthcare industry.  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of the AIM companies across industries. Source: created by the 
author. 
                                               
28 Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). ICB. Accessed March 25, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.icbenchmark.com. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
In the period between 2005 and 2016 an average listed company on AIM had sales of 69 
million UK pounds, price-to-book ratio 2.662 and free cash flow to sales -0.458. It spent 27% of 
sales on capital expenditures. The average growth of sales for such companies was 11.574% and 
operating performance was -0.089, which means that, on average, the companies were growing 
but the operational performance was quite low. The full results of the descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 10. 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for the variables of AIM companies 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Duration 5.513 3.423 1 12 
OpPerf -0.089 0.801 -3.732 5.121 
Sales 
1
 69 030 454 133 30 4 991 500 
SalGr 11.574 46.897 -167.850 299.511 
CAPEX_Sales 0.274 1.431 0 27.509 
Turnover volume 
2
 70 225 454 133 1.1 20 800 000 
FCFrat -0.458 5.623 -49.571 69.252 
PB 2.662 7.315 -92.851 92.721 
1 - in thousands of UK pounds 
2 – in thousands of shares 
   
Source: created by the author. 
 
The results of testing for pairwise correlations between all the independent variables are 
presented in Table 11. A sample of all firms was used to calculate the coefficients. The strongest 
significant positive correlation (0.327) is between size of the companies and the operating 
performance ratio, which is the highest ratio in terms of absolute values. Large companies tend 
to have better operating performance. A significant negative correlation (-0.307) takes place 
between free cash flow ratio and the ratio of capital expenditures to net sales. Companies, which 
have large undistributed free cash flows, do not spend a lot of it on capital expenditures. Also, 
larger companies have lower capital expenditures (-0.230). 
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Table 11. Pairwise correlations between the independent variables. 
 CAPEX_Sales PB FCFrat LnSales OpPerf SalGr 
CAPEX_Sales 1      
PB 0.007 
(0.610) 
1     
FCFrat -0.307***    
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.933) 
1    
LnSales -0.230*** 
(0.000) 
-0.045*** 
(0.002) 
0.194*** 
(0.000)    
1   
OpPerf -0.036** 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.331)  
-0.074***   
(0.000)  
0.327*** 
(0.000)    
1  
SalGr 0.041*** 
(0.005)    
0.037**   
(0.011) 
-0.058**  
(0.0001)  
0.063***  
(0.000)   
0.100***  
(0.000)   
1 
 
*** denotes significance at 1% level 
** denotes significance at 5% level 
* denotes significance at 10% level 
Source: created by the author. 
 
The characteristics of companies that went private and those that stayed public by the end 
of 2016 were compared. Student’s t-tests were conducted to assess the statistical significance of 
differences between the two samples. The results of the difference-in-means testing are presented 
in Table 12. 
Table 12. Difference-in-means test results. 
*** denotes significance at 1% level 
** denotes significance at 5% level 
* denotes significance at 10% level 
Source: created by the author. 
 
Firms that went 
private 
Firms that stayed 
public 
Difference 
CAPEX_Sales 0.168 0.310 0.142*** 
PB 2.474 2.725 0.251 
FCFrat 1.141 -1.001 -2.141*** 
Sales
1
 54 543 73 946 19 403** 
OpPerf -0.286 -0.022 0.265*** 
Operating Margin -1.540 -0.910 0.630*** 
Asset Turnover 1.258 1.219 -0.038 
SalGr -8.182 18.278 26.459*** 
Turnover volume
2
 81 965 66 241 -15 724 
Firm-year observations 1208 3560  
1 - in thousands of UK pounds 
2 – in thousands of shares 
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Firms that went private spent less on capital expenditures and had lower sales growth 
measures. Moreover, companies that stayed public, on average, were larger because they had 
larger sales. The operating performance results for companies stayed public were higher, than of 
those that went private. Decomposing operating performance into operating margin and asset 
turnover shows that the difference originates from the operating margin (-1.540% for delisted 
firms versus -0.910% for control firms). There is no significant difference in mean of price-to-
book ratio, turnover volume of shares between two groups. However, these results need to be 
confirmed by an empirical study before any definitive conclusions can be made. 
2.2.2 Main Market 
For the Main Market companies, the companies that were listed on the London Stock 
Exchange for the same period were also selected. Initially the total number of companies on the 
Main Market was 1754, of which 884 have already delisted from 2005 and 870 were still listing 
on the stock exchange. The data for independent variables was taken from Thomson Datastream, 
Thomson Reuters Eikon databases and annual reports of the companies. The total number of 
firm-years observations was almost 18000. Again some of the companies were excluded, 
because there were no data for some of the variables in databases and the reports. 
The same procedure of collection the data as with AIM was repeated, and firm-year 
observations, for which the data was absent for at least one of the variables in the model, were 
eliminated. In the end, the final sample contained 6276 firm-year observations representing 799 
unique firms, of which 435 delisted and 364 were still public by the end of 2016.  The Figure 4 
represents the distribution of the companies across industries. 27% of these companies represent 
industrials, 20% of the companies represent consumer services industry, 15% of the companies 
are from financial industry, 11% of the companies are technological companies, while another 
9% are companies producing consumer goods. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of the Main Market companies across industries. Source: created by 
the author. 
Descriptive Statistics 
In the period between 2005 and 2016 an average listed company on Main Market had 
sales of 3.3 billion UK pounds, price-to-book ratio 2.743 and free cash flow to sales -0.106. It 
spent 12.7% of sales on capital expenditures. The average growth of sales for such companies 
was 5.178% and operating performance was -0.082, which means that, on average, the 
companies were also growing but the operating performance was negative. The full results of the 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for the variable of Main Market companies. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Duration 5.656 3.451 1 12 
OpPerf -0.082 0.902 -1.962 1.765 
Sales 
1
 3 319 809 16 300 000 45 362 000 000 
SalGr 5.178 28.634 -100 914.72 
CAPEX_Sales 0.127 0.617 3.00e-05 19.843 
Turnover volume 
2
 593 513 2 877 341 2 92 600 000 
FCFrat -0.106 1.059 -29.725 15.987 
PB 2.743 4.088 -14.95 38.97 
1 - in thousands of UK pounds 
2 – in thousands of shares 
   
Source: created by the author. 
 
The results of testing for pairwise correlations between all the independent variables are 
presented in Table 14. A sample of all firms from the Main Market was used to calculate the 
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coefficients. The strongest significant positive correlation (0.396) is between size of the 
companies and the operating performance ratio. Large companies tend to have better operating 
performance. A significant negative correlation (-0.540) takes place between free cash flow ratio 
and the ratio of capital expenditures to net sales, which is the highest correlation value in terms 
of absolute values. Companies, which have large undistributed free cash flows, do not spend a 
lot of it on capital expenditures.  
Table 14. Pairwise correlations between the independent variables. 
 CAPEX_Sales PB FCFrat LnSales OpPerf SalGr 
CAPEX_Sales 1      
PB -0.052*** 
(0.000) 
1     
FCFrat -0.540***    
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.925) 
1    
LnSales -0.155*** 
(0.000) 
0.062*** 
(0.000) 
0.255*** 
(0.000)    
1   
OpPerf -0.036*** 
(0.005) 
0.059*** 
(0.000)  
0.206***   
(0.000)  
0.396*** 
(0.000)    
1  
SalGr -0.023* 
(0.070)    
0.082***   
(0.000) 
-0.019  
(0.134)  
-0.026**  
(0.039)   
0.048***  
(0.000)   
1 
*** denotes significance at 1% level 
** denotes significance at 5% level 
* denotes significance at 10% level 
Source: created by the author. 
 
The characteristics of companies that went private and those that stayed public on Main 
Market by the end of 2016 were also compared. The results of the difference-in-means testing 
are presented in Table 15. 
Table 15. Difference-in-means test results. 
 
Firms that went 
private 
Firms that stayed 
public 
Difference 
CAPEX_Sales  0.153 0.115 -0.038** 
PB 2.389 2.898 0.509*** 
FCFrat -0.196 -0.066 0.129*** 
Sales 
1
 758 682 4 446 987 3 688 305*** 
OpPerf -0.514 0.107 0.856*** 
Operating Margin -1.762 0.143 1.905*** 
Assets Turnover 1.011 0.983 -0.029 
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*** denotes significance at 1% level 
** denotes significance at 5% level 
* denotes significance at 10% level 
Source: created by the author. 
 
Firms that went private spent more on capital expenditures and had lower sales growth 
measures. Moreover, companies that stayed public, on average, were larger in terms of net sales 
value. The operating performance results for companies stayed public were higher, than of those 
that went private. The difference comes from operating margin (0.143 for companies stayed 
public and -1.762 for delisted companies). Companies that delisted from the Main Market on 
average had lower price-to-book ratios, free cash flows and were less liquid on the market, as 
they had lower turnover by volume. Again these results need to be confirmed by an empirical 
study to make any exact conclusions. 
2.2.3 Summary of Data Description 
The companies of both markets mostly operate in the same industries. Largest share of 
both markets companies operates in industrials. The descriptive statistics of the variables for 
both AIM and Main Market companies is presented in Table 16. Main Market companies, on 
average, stayed longer on the stock exchange. The operating performance of the companies, on 
average, was almost the same and negative for companies of both markets. Companies on the 
Main Market are much larger than companies on AIM in terms of generated net sales. The sales 
growth figure, on average, is larger for the companies on AIM because there are young and 
growing companies, which are still developing. The Main Market companies are more stable in 
the sales growth figures and for such large companies the sales growth number is smaller 
because they have already passed the period of high upswings of sales. Companies on AIM, on 
average, are investing in capital expenditures almost twice more than companies on Main 
Market. Again for growing companies these investments can be described by the fact that they 
are still developing their business. Turnover volume of share trading, as well as free cash flow 
ratio and price-to-book ratio is higher for Main Market companies.  
 
 
SalGr -1.938 8.311 10.249*** 
Turnover volume 
2
 136 593 794 608 658 015*** 
Firm-year observations 1918 4358  
1 - in thousands of UK pounds 
2 – in thousands of shares 
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Table 16. Descriptive statistics of variables of companies on AIM and Main Market. 
Variable AIM MM 
Duration 5.513 5.656 
OpPerf -0.089 -0.082 
Sales 
1
 69 030 3 319 809 
SalGr 11.574 5.178 
CAPEX_Sales 0.274 0.127 
Turnover volume 
2
 70 225 593 513 
FCFrat -0.458 -0.106 
PB 2.662 2.743 
1 - in thousands of UK pounds 
2 – in thousands of shares 
 
Source: created by the author. 
2.3 Empirical Results and Discussions 
In this section, different descriptive analyses and modeling techniques are used. There are 
three parametric models, which were built for the purpose of determining the factors related to 
the company’s decision to go private. The final model, which is used for the interpretation of the 
obtained results, is a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model. 
2.3.1 Alternative Investment Market 
The description of the sample made for the modeling is provided in Table 17. It can be 
seen again that the number of subjects is 4768 and time at risk is 26340, which equals the sum of 
all the observations’ years included in the sample. Each of the observations has been observed 
between 1 and 12 years. The number of failures (delistings) is equal to 1208 and consequently 
25% of all the companies.  
Table 17. Sample description. 
  [--------------------------Per subject------------------------------] 
Category Total Mean Min Median Max 
no. of subjects 4768     
no. of records 4768 1 1 1 1 
(first) entry time  0 0 0 0 
(final) exit time  5.512794 1 5 12 
subjects with gap 0     
time on gap if gap 0     
time at risk 26285 5.512794 1 5 12 
failures 1208 0.2533557 0 0 1 
Source: created by the author. 
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The incidence rate is presented in Table 18. It equals to 0.046, which is the incidence rate 
of the delisting of all time at risk. 
Table 18. Incidence rate description. 
    [-------------Survival time--------------] 
 Time at risk 
Incidence 
rate 
No. of 
subjects 
25% 50% 75% 
Total 26285 0.0459578 4768 6 - - 
Source: created by the author. 
 
The smoothed hazard estimate is presented on the Figure 5. The hazard rate is going 
down particularly over the periods from 4 to 10. As the time goes on, companies are less likely 
to go private from the AIM of the London Stock Exchange. 
 
 
Figure 5. Smoothed hazard estimate. Source: created by the author. 
On the Figure 6 the cumulative hazard estimate is presented. It is increasing over time 
and shows the cumulative estimates. It takes the maximum number at the end of the 12
th
 
observed year and the cumulative hazard estimate equals to 0.42. The hazard rate is steeper for 
the first 6 years of observation. Therefore, the risk of delisting is higher during the first 6 years. 
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Figure 6. Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate. Source: created by the author. 
The survival estimates are presented on Figure 7. They always start from 1, as the sample 
is full and at the beginning of the period none of the companies is gone private. As time goes on, 
they are going down to 65% of the sample that remained at the end of the study. So, during the 
period number 5 (year 2010) about 75% of the sample remained public, while during the period 
number 8 about 69% of the companies were still surviving, meaning that they have not delisted. 
 
Figure 7. Kaplan-Meier survival estimate. Source: created by the author. 
The more detailed list of the survivor function is presented in Table 19. This represents 
the table with all the periods, the total number of the companies beginning in the sample, how 
many companies delisted in each period. Moreover, the survivor function is presented over time, 
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which comes to already mentioned number of 65% of survived companies in the end of the 
study.  
Table 19. List of survivor function. 
Time 
Beg. 
Total 
Fail Net Lost 
Survivor 
Function 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
1 4768 285 328 0.9402 0.0034 0.9331 0.9466 
2 4155 250 328 0.8837 0.0047 0.8740 0.8926 
3 3577 210 325 0.8318 0.0057 0.8204 0.8425 
4 3042 157 313 0.7888 0.0063 0.7762 0.8009 
5 2572 103 309 0.7573 0.0068 0.7437 0.7703 
6 2160 64 300 0.7348 0.0071 0.7205 0.7485 
7 1796 51 290 0.7140 0.0075 0.6989 0.7284 
8 1455 35 284 0.6968 0.0079 0.6810 0.7119 
9 1136 25 282 0.6814 0.0083 0.6649 0.6974 
10 829 18 274 0.6666 0.0088 0.6491 0.6836 
11 537 9 270 0.6555 0.0094 0.6367 0.6736 
12 258 1 257 0.6529 0.0097 0.6335 0.6716 
Source: created by the author. 
 
In this master thesis three parametric models were considered:  
1. Exponential regression coefficients and hazard rates. 
2. Weibull regression coefficients and hazard rates. 
3. Gompertz regression coefficients and hazard rates. 
All the model results are presented in the Table 20. The results, coefficients, their 
magnitude, interpretations of the model and the hazard ratios are very similar to the semi-
parametric Cox proportional hazard model. Therefore, the obtained results of the research study 
can be considered consistent across models, as they produce the same conclusions. Thus, for the 
purpose of interpretation of the results, it was decided to concentrate on the results of the Cox 
model. The coefficients and hazard ratios of different models are presented in Table 20. A 
positive coefficient means a lower duration on the exchange, while a negative coefficient means 
higher duration. Hazard ratios from 0 to 1 signify negative relationship between variable and the 
conditional probability of being delisted. The hazard rate more than 1 signifies a positive 
relationship between the variable and the conditional probability of being delisted.
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Table 20. Empirical study results (coefficients, hazard ratios) for AIM companies. 
Variable 
Exponential 
coefficient 
Weibull 
coefficient 
Gompertz 
coefficient 
Cox 
coefficient 
Exponential 
H.R. 
Weibull 
H.R. 
Gompertz 
H.R. 
Cox 
H.R. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CAPEX_Sales -0.076** -0.078** -0.076** -0.0739** 0.927 0.925 0.927 0.929 
OpPerf -0.042** -0.048** -0.042** -0.038** 0.959 0.954 0.959 0.963 
SalGr -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 
Liq -0.020 -0.024* -0.021 -0.014 0.979 0.976 0.979 0.986 
PB 4.13e-04 4.97e-04 4.08e-04 6.44e-04 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.001 
FCFrat 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 1.019 1.019 1.019 1.018 
LnSales -0.039** -0.043** -0.040** -0.035** 0.961 0.958 0.961 0.965 
Crisis 1.091*** 1.256*** 1.099*** 0.934*** 2.979 3.511 3.004 2.546 
Firms that went 
private 
1208 1208 1208 1208     
Control firms 3570 3570 3570 3570     
Firm-year 
observations 
4768 4768 4768 4768     
Log likelihood -3433.828*** -3405.510*** -3433.775*** -9520.204***     
*** denotes significance at 1% level         
** denotes significance at 5% level         
* denotes significance at 10% level         
Source: created by the author. 
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First of all, the model itself is significant at 1% level, as evidenced by log likelihood 
statistics. The effect of variable CAPEX_Sales is significant at 5% level. A negative coefficient 
of -0.076 means that if the capital expenditures of the company increase, the time to going 
private increases, so the event of delisting is less likely to happen. The hazard rate of this 
variable equals 0.929. So, holding other variables constant, for a 1 unit change in capital 
expenditures divided by net sales the hazard rate of the going private decreases by 6%, which is 
in line with our hypothesis. This means that the more company invests in capital expenditures, 
the less likely that the company will go private. Hence, there is a necessity for the companies on 
AIM to raise more capital and first hypothesis can be accepted.  
Operating performance of the companies appeared to be significant at 1% level in the 
model. The coefficient equals -0.042 suggesting that operating performance is important for the 
companies considering the decision to go private. The negative coefficient means that an 
increase in operating performance, and EBITDA more precisely, decreases the time to go 
private. The hazard rate equals to 0.963, meaning that, holding other variables constant, for a 1 
unit increase in operating performance ratio, the hazard rate of going private decreases by 3.7%. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is accepted. 
The coefficient of sales growth is significant at 1% level. The coefficient equals to -
0.010, meaning that an increase in sales growth increases the time to going private event. The 
hazard rate equals 0.989, meaning that holding other variables constant, for a 1 unit increase in 
sales growth the hazard rate decreases by 1.1%. This can be explained by the fact that companies 
from the alternative investment market have very volatile sales figures. For example, Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) found an evidence for the hypothesis of the situation when companies going 
private showed lower growth figures. Thus, the third hypothesis is accepted. 
As shown in the model specification, liquidity is insignificant, indicating the importance 
of liquidity (hypothesis 4) to the decision of being public cannot be interpreted.  
The effect of the variable LnSales is significant and negative at 5% level, suggesting 
modest support for the existence of a negative relationship between firm size and likelihood of 
going private. According to the results of the research by Martinez and Serve (2011) since large 
firms may be more efficient at amortizing fixed costs of public status, most likely small 
businesses will be more motivated to implement delisting when the direct costs of maintaining 
the listing increase. This means that the larger the net sales of the company, the risk of going 
private is lower. The hazard ratio equals 0.97, meaning that holding other variables constant, for 
a 1 unit increase in net sales, the hazard ratio decreases by 3%. 
The free cash flow ratio to sales is significant at 1% level. The coefficient equals 0.018, 
which means that an increase in undistributed free cash flow of the company means the shorter 
61 
 
time to delist, so the going private event is more likely to happen. The hazard rate equals 1.02. If 
the free cash flow increases by 1 unit, the hazard rate increases by 2%. Therefore, there is 
evidence in favor of Jensen free-cash-flow hypothesis, supporting the idea of agency costs. This 
can be explained by the fact that in companies from AIM there are high agency costs and the 
funds could be returned to shareholders in the form of higher dividends or used to repurchase 
stock, which again increases returns to shareholders. 
The dummy variable crisis is significant at 1% level, which means that there is a 
significant difference for companies that went private during the financial crisis and in other 
years. The hazard rate equals 2.55. It means that companies during the crisis years are 2.55 times 
more likely to go private than in non-crisis years. 
The price-to-book ratio is also not significant in the model. 
Thus, the research goal is met by establishing the relationship between companies’ size, 
capital expenditures, free cash flow, operating performance and liquidity of share trading and the 
decision to go private on the AIM market.  
To sum up, evidence for three hypotheses out of four stated in the first section of the 
master thesis was found. The results of the hypothesis 4 cannot be interpreted as the coefficient 
for this variable was insignificant. The hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 can be accepted and it can be 
concluded that companies that spend more on the capital expenditures, have better operating 
performance, and those with higher growth prospects in terms of sales growth, are less likely to 
delist. These results can be explained by the fact that the alternative investment market consists 
of the young, risky and growing companies. The results of their investments are difficult to 
predict, and sales growth does not motivate them to go private. Moreover, it can be concluded 
that larger companies which are more efficient at amortizing listing costs are less likely to go 
private. Finally, companies which have higher free cash flow are more likely to go private and 
probably via LBO, as the increased debt repayment obligations will positively influence the 
distribution of cash flows and eliminate the agency problem. 
2.3.2 Main Market 
The description of the sample of Main Market companies made for the modeling is 
provided in Table 21. It can be seen again that the number of subjects is 6276 and time at risk is 
35497 which equals the sum of all the observations’ years included in the sample. Each of the 
observations has been observed between 1 and 12 years. The number of failures (delistings) is 
equal to 1918 and consequently 31% of all the companies.  
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Table 21. Sample description 
  [--------------------------Per subject------------------------------] 
Category Total Mean Min Median Max 
no. of subjects 6276     
no. of records 6276 1 1 1 1 
(first) entry time  0 0 0 0 
(final) exit time  5.655991 1 5 12 
subjects with gap 0     
time on gap if gap 0     
time at risk 35497 5.655991 1 5 12 
failures 1918 0.305609 0 0 1 
Source: created by the author. 
 
The incidence rate is presented in Table 22. It equals to 0.054, which is the incidence rate 
of the delisting of all time at risk. 
Table 22. Incidence rate description 
    [----------Survival time----------] 
 Time at risk 
Incidence 
rate 
No. of 
subjects 
25% 50% 75% 
Total 35497 0.0540327 6276 5 - - 
Source: created by the author. 
 
The smoothed hazard estimate is presented on the Figure 8. The hazard rate is going 
down, particularly over the periods from 4 to 10. As the time goes on, companies are less likely 
to go private from the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. 
 
Figure 8. Smoothed hazard estimate. Source: created by the author. 
.0
3
.0
3
5
.0
4
.0
4
5
.0
5
.0
5
5
0 5 10 15
analysis time
Smoothed hazard estimate
63 
 
On the Figure 9 the cumulative hazard estimate is presented. It is increasing over time 
and shows the cumulative estimates. It takes the maximum number at the end of the 12
th
 
observed year and the cumulative hazard estimate equals to 0.54. The hazard rate is steeper for 
the first 5 years of observation. Therefore, the risk of delisting is higher during the first 5 years.  
 
Figure 9. Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate. Source: created by the author. 
The survival estimates are presented on Figure 10. On the first period it equals 1, as the 
sample is full and at the beginning of the period none of the companies is gone private. As time 
goes on they are going down to 58% of the sample that remained at the end of the study. So, 
during the period number 5 about 74% of the sample remained public, while during the period 
number 8 about 65% of the companies are still surviving, meaning that they have not delisted. 
 
Figure 10. Kaplan-Meier survival estimate. Source: created by the author. 
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The more detailed list of the survivor function is presented in Table 23. This represents 
the table with all the periods, the total number of the companies beginning in the sample, how 
many companies delisted in each period. Moreover, the survivor function is presented over time, 
which comes to already mentioned number of 58% of survived companies in the end of the 
study.  
Table 23. List of survivor function. 
Time 
Beg. 
Total 
Fail Net Lost 
Survivor 
Function 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
1 6276 436 364 0.9305 0.0032 0.9240 0.9366 
2 5476 359 364 0.8695 0.0043 0.8608 0.8777 
3 4753 281 364 0.8181 0.0050 0.8080 0.8278 
4 4108 212 364 0.7759 0.0056 0.7648 0.7866 
5 3532 175 364 0.7375 0.0060 0.7255 0.7490 
6 2993 139 364 0.7032 0.0064 0.6905 0.7155 
7 2490 105 363 0.6736 0.0067 0.6602 0.6865 
8 2022 76 363 0.6482 0.0071 0.6342 0.6619 
9 1583 63 363 0.6224 0.0075 0.6075 0.6370 
10 1157 49 363 0.8961 0.0081 0.5801 0.6117 
11 745 21 362 0.5793 0.0086 0.5621 0.5960 
12 362 2 360 0.5761 0.0089 0.5584 0.5933 
 Source: created by the author. 
 
The full results of Exponential, Weibull, Gompertz and Cox survival models are 
presented in the Table 24. The results of the hazard ratios are consistent across models, because 
they produce the same conclusions for the hypothesis testing and determinants interpretation.
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Table 24. Empirical study results (coefficients, hazard ratios) for Main Market companies. 
Variable 
Exponential 
coefficient 
Weibull 
coefficient 
Gompertz 
coefficient 
Cox 
coefficient 
Exponential 
H.R. 
Weibull 
H.R. 
Gompertz 
H.R. 
Cox 
H.R. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CAPEX_Sales -0.005 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.995 1.001 0.997 0.994 
OpPerf -0.088*** -0.095*** -0.092*** -0.086*** 0.916 0.909 0.912 0.918 
SalGr -0.012*** -0.0112*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 0.988 0.989 0.989 0.988 
Liq -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 0.954 0.954 0.953 0.955 
PB 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 1.002 1.002 1.001 1.002 
FCFrat 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.078*** 1.082 1.087 1.009 1.081 
LnSales -0.218*** -0.227*** -0.223*** -0.216*** 0.804 0.797 0.801 0.805 
Crisis 0.818*** 1.039*** 0.942*** 0.803*** 2.267 2.829 2.566 2.232 
Firms that went 
private 
1918 1918 1918 1918     
Control firms 4358 4358 4358 4358     
Firm-year 
observations 
6276 6276 6276 6276     
Log likelihood -4817.203*** -4739.164*** -4799.258*** -15342.772***     
*** denotes significance at 1% level         
** denotes significance at 5% level         
* denotes significance at 10% level         
Source: created by the author. 
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The ratio of capital expenditures to net sales is not significant in the model and, thus, the 
results cannot be interpreted for the first hypothesis. 
Operating performance of the companies appeared to be significant at 1% level in the 
model. The coefficient equals -0.086 suggesting that operating performance is important for the 
companies considering the decision to go private. The negative coefficient means that an 
increase in operating performance, and EBITDA more precisely, decreases the time to go 
private. The hazard rate equals to 0.916, meaning that holding other variables constant, for a 1 
unit increase in operating performance ratio, the hazard rate of going private decreases by 8.4%. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is accepted.  
The coefficient of sales growth is significant at 1% level. The coefficient equals to -
0.012, meaning that an increase in sales growth decreases the time to going private event. The 
hazard rate equals 0.988, meaning that, holding other variables constant, for a 1 unit increase in 
sales growth the hazard rate decreases by 1.2%. So, it can be concluded that in the case of Main 
Market the third hypothesis was accepted. So, for large companies on the Main Market an 
increase in sales is rather difficult task, therefore growth prospects play an important role in the 
decision to go private. 
As shown in the model specification, liquidity is significant at 1% level, indicating the 
importance of liquidity to the decision of being public. The coefficient of this variable equals -
0.047 meaning that an increase in turnover by volume increases the time to delist. The hazard 
ratio of this variable equals 0.955. This means that, holding other variables constant, for a 1 unit 
increase in turnover volume of shares the hazard rate decreases by 5.5%. The evidence for the 
same hypothesis was found in previous studies Bharath and Dittmar (2010), Boot, Gopalan and 
Thalor (2006), Martinez and Serve (2011), suggesting that liquidity (volume of turnover of 
shares) may be a consistent motivation for the delisting. Hence, the fourth hypothesis is 
accepted. 
The free cash flow ratio to sales is significant at 1% level. The coefficient equals 0.078, 
which means that an increase in undistributed free cash flow of the company means the shorter 
time to delist. The hazard rate equals 1.081. Holding other variables constant, if the free cash 
flow increases by 1 unit, the hazard rate increases by 8.1%. This result confirms the hypothesis 
and, therefore, there is evidence in favor of Jensen free-cash-flow hypothesis, supporting the 
hypothesis of agency costs.  
The effect of variable LnSales is significant and negative at 1% level, suggesting modest 
support for the existence of a negative relationship between firm size and probability of going 
private. According to results in the research of Martinez and Serve (2011), since large firms may 
be more efficient at amortizing these fixed costs, most likely small businesses will be more 
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motivated to implement delisting when the direct costs of maintaining the listing increase. This 
means that the larger the net sales of the company, the going private transaction is less likely to 
happen. The hazard ratio equals 0.8, meaning that for a 1 unit increase in net sales, the hazard 
ratio decreases by 20%. The Main Market of the London Stock Exchange is more regulated than 
AIM. Moreover, the fees for the admission of shares and annual fees are much higher for the 
companies on Main Market.
29, 30 
As a result of this, companies have much higher costs of being 
public and in such circumstances it is crucial to amortize fixed costs of being public. Companies 
which are unable to amortize these fixed costs are more motivated to go private. 
The dummy variable crisis is significant at 1% level, which means that there is a 
significant difference for companies that went private during the financial crisis and in other 
years. In other words, during the crisis years companies are 2.23 times are more likely to leave 
Main Market. 
The price-to-book ratio is not significant in the model and the result cannot be 
interpreted. 
Thus, the research goal is met by establishing the relationship between companies’ size, 
capital expenditures, free cash flow, operating performance and liquidity of share trading and the 
decision to go private on the Main Market.  
To sum up, evidence for three hypotheses out of four stated in the first section of the 
master thesis was found. The results of the hypothesis 1 cannot be interpreted as the coefficient 
for the variable was insignificant. The hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 are accepted and it can be 
concluded that companies that have better operating performance, higher growth prospects in 
terms of sales growth and which shares are more liquid, are less likely to delist. Larger 
companies, which are more efficient at amortizing listing costs, are less likely to go private. 
Companies, which deteriorate the volume of trading, are more likely to go private, as for such 
companies on the Main Market the liquidity of share trading is a primary benefit of going public. 
Also share trading on an exchange is cheaper compared to bilateral trades, and this liquidity 
benefit (which is an increasing function of the trading volume) leads companies to be public. 
Finally, companies, which have higher free cash flow, are more likely to go private, because in 
case of LBO, for example, the increased debt repayment obligations will positively influence the 
distribution of cash flows and eliminate the agency problem. 
                                               
29 Fees calculator. London Stock Exchange. Accessed April 1, 2017. Retrieved from 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/companies-and-advisors/main-market/listing-fees/mm-fees-
calculator.html. 
30 AIM. Fees for companies and nominated advisers. London Stock Exchange. Accessed April 1, 2017. 
Retrieved from http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/publications/aim-fees.pdf. 
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2.3.3 Summary of Empirical Results 
The hypotheses testing results are presented in Table 25. Moreover, the assumptions on 
the expected sign of other determinants for the decision to go private and sign approval for both 
markets are also included in the table. The first hypothesis is accepted only for the sample of 
AIM companies. Companies on this market are young and growing; they have a large leverage 
and/or high transaction costs. They need to attract large amounts of capital to keep on 
developing. Such companies invest in capital expenditures and they have an access to the low-
cost external financing on the stock exchange for such investments. For Main Market companies 
this variable is insignificant and interpretation about capital expenditures serving as a 
determinant for the delisting decision cannot be provided.  
The operating performance appeared to be a significant driving factor for the delisting 
decision. The hazard ratio of this variable is two times stronger for the Main Market companies. 
This can be explained by the fact that companies on AIM have rather volatile operating 
performance figures, while more stable companies on Main Market strive to achieve more 
efficient operating performance and as a result have more stable figures. So, for Main Market 
such unexpected drops of operating performance are more sensible and can be an indicator that 
the company should delist in order to restructure. The results of the models also showed that 
managers of both markets companies can voluntary delist in order to hide the deteriorating 
operating performance, because such figures increase the risk of bankruptcy due to increase in 
financial distress costs. 
The growth prospects are also important for the companies of both markets. While AIM 
companies have rather unstable sales growth figures, Main Market companies have more stable 
growth prospects. For both markets an increase in sales leads to a decrease of hazard rate of 
going private. For Main Market companies, decrease of hazard rate of going private is slightly 
more sensible, because their growth prospects, unlike AIM’s companies figures, are more 
constant and they, on average, do not have shocks in sales. So, the companies with high growth 
opportunities prefer to stay in the market to raise further capital. The results of this hypothesis 
can also be strengthened by the agency costs hypothesis. The results of the models on both 
markets showed that desirable candidates for going private transactions are firms where agency 
costs of free cash flows are high, that is, firms with low growth prospects and large free cash 
flows. Additionally, these firms may have managers who may not be increasing or may even be 
reducing dividend payout to increase further the resources, and thus the control, available to 
them.  
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The liquidity appeared to be a significant determinant for the Main Market companies. 
Zingales (1995) and Mello and Parsons (1998) posit that the role of an IPO is to establish the 
market price/value for a firm and thus provide liquidity. Based on the theoretical implications of 
these models, liquidity is therefore a benefit to being a public firm that is considered in the 
choice between public and private ownership. So, when the liquidity of shares on Main Market 
deteriorates, companies are more likely to go private, because models showed that their time to 
delisting is shorter. 
Size of the company is significant for the models of both markets. Annual listing fees, 
trading costs (brokerage fees), information production costs, compliance costs to meet regulatory 
and corporate governance standards; financial distress costs due to poor performance; indirect 
costs related to the firms’ undervaluation are incurred by the public companies. The models 
results showed that for both markets companies able to more efficiently amortize fixed costs of 
listing will leave the public market later. The hazard ratio of the size is stronger for the Main 
Market companies. The regulation process on the Main Market is stricter and it is more 
expensive to list on the Main Market than on the AIM. On AIM market the companies have 
either to comply with the rules of the exchange or explain to the exchange and shareholders why 
it is not done. 
During the crisis years for the companies on both markets the hazard ratios are more than 
two times higher than during non-crisis years. 
Finally, while for the AIM companies only operating performance plays an important role 
in the decision to go private, for the Main Market companies market performance is also 
important (liquidity). 
Table 25. Research results. 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Investment 
Market 
Main 
Market 
There is a negative relationship between the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales and the decision to go private 
Accepted - 
There is a negative relationship between the performance and 
the decision to go private 
Accepted Accepted 
There is a negative relationship between firm’s growth prospects 
and the decision to go private 
Accepted Accepted 
There is a negative relationship between stock liquidity and the 
decision to go private 
- Accepted 
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Assumption about the expected sign and hazard ratio 
Alternative 
Investment 
Market 
Main 
Market 
Agency problem Proved Proved 
Size of the company Proved Proved 
Crisis Proved Proved 
Undervaluation - - 
Source: created by the author. 
 
The results of the study have a number of managerial implications. For the owners of the 
companies both on AIM and Main Market, which have a situation when there is a high level of 
undistributed free cash flow and low growth opportunities it is proved to be wise to go private in 
order to decrease the agency conflict and to stimulate managers for an efficient work and not to 
distribute cash on projects of low potential. Since going private transactions are frequently 
leveraged buyouts, which are financed by high debt, the proposal is to delist to reduce the agency 
cost of free cash flows.  
For the investors seeking a profitable strategy it would be important to monitor the 
companies, which have decreasing turnover volume of shares (on the Main Market) and 
operating performance (on both markets), as in this case the company is more likely to go private 
and shareholders can get an excess return like in the case of Daisy Group. Numerous studies 
showed that higher debt to capital ratio of the company was negatively correlated with 
productivity growth. Thus, private companies investing in capital expenditures can go to the 
AIM in order to rebalance their financial structure, as the results of the model showed the longer 
time to delist for companies investing in capital expenditures due to the access to low-cost 
capital market. So, the companies on AIM interested in future productivity growth due to 
previous capital expenditures should rebalance their capital structure with share trading. 
For the London Stock Exchange it is important to enhance the liquidity of shares of Main 
Market companies, because the increased number of delistings due to poor liquidity of shares 
leads to the loss of listing costs for the exchange. The survival of firms could be a benchmark for 
regulators to measure the success of the rules that they impose on firms planning to be listed or 
undertake a reverse takeover. Additionally, firms and policy markets are interested in IPO 
survival, given that as long as a firm remains listed, it can raise funding from public markets. 
2.3.4    Research Limitations 
This research has a number of limitations due to some aspects described hereunder: 
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1. The London Stock Exchange discloses the information about the delistings from 
Alternative Investment Market only. The companies included in the research 
were chosen from the lists of the delisted companies. The collection of the 
companies from Main Market for the research was done manually and this 
significantly increased the time of the collection of the representative sample. 
2. The absence of the access to the databases with more complete information for 
the variables. Some of the companies were excluded from the final sample due to 
inability to find data for the variables. 
3. The list of the variables included in the model can be extended in the future 
researches. It might be interesting to cover other aspects of the companies’ 
structure, such as corporate governance. 
4. The study can be extended to other markets in order to compare the determinants 
of the going private transaction. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this study the determinants of the going private transaction were analyzed. The goal of 
the study was to determine the factors that are related to the company’s decision to go private. In 
order to reach the goal, all the objectives of the research were achieved.  
In the first step the theoretical concepts of the going private transactions were analyzed 
and key components and aspects of these types of change of the legal form of organizations were 
considered. Based on theoretical and empirical literature determinants of the going private 
decision were observed from the point of two different categories: the operational performance 
of the companies and the results of activity on the stock exchange. 
  Furthermore, the theoretical approaches to motivations of the delisting decision were 
described and justified. In the second step an econometrical analysis was conducted, which 
helped to identify the determinants of the decision to go private.  
The results of the empirical study for the companies on Alternative Investment Market 
suggest that the most significant factors that determine the risk of a company going private are 
the level of operating performance (how efficiently a company is generating EBITDA), and the 
level of capital expenditures (easier access to the equity market). The level of growth prospects 
also appeared to be a significant driving factor for the delisting decision. These results show that 
the operational performance of the companies on Alternative Investment Market plays a 
significant role in the company’s decision to go private. The results of the activity on the stock 
exchange appeared to be insignificant for the companies on Alternative Investment Market, 
while the amount of free cash flow generated by the company was also found to have some 
effect on the risk of the company being delisted. Consistent with previous studies, the size of the 
company describing its ability to amortize fixed costs of public status had relation to the decision 
to go private. Moreover, during the crisis years the companies are more likely to delist from the 
Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange. 
The obtained results for Alternative Investment Market companies allowed to accept 
three out of four hypotheses of the research: the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship 
between the ratio of capital expenditures to sales and the decision to go private; that there is a 
negative relationship between the performance and the decision to go private; and that there is a 
negative relationship between firm’s growth prospects and the decision to go private.  
The hypothesis about a presence of a negative relationship between stock liquidity and 
the decision to go private cannot be interpreted as the result of the regression analysis showed 
that this factor is insignificant. 
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The results of the study for companies on Main Market showed slightly different results. 
The most important driving factor in the decision to go private is the size of the company, 
operating performance and the liquidity of shares (opposite to the companies on Alternative 
Investment Market). The level of free cash flow and growth prospects had some effect on the 
hazard of the companies being delisted. Moreover, during the crisis years the companies are 
more likely to delist from the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. The level of capital 
expenditures for such companies appeared to be insignificant. The price-to-book ratio as well as 
for the companies on Alternative Investment Market also was insignificant. 
The obtained results for Main Market companies allowed to accept three out of four 
hypotheses of the research: the hypothesis about the presence of a negative relationship between 
the operating performance and the decision to go private; the hypothesis that there is a negative 
relationship between firm’s growth prospects and the decision to go private; and that there is a 
negative relationship between stock liquidity and the decision to go private. The hypothesis 
about a presence of a negative relationship between capital expenditures to sales and the decision 
to go private cannot be interpreted as the results of the regression analysis showed that these 
factors are insignificant. 
The overall results of the hypothesis testing for both markets of the London Stock 
Exchange are presented in the Table 26.   
Table 26. The results of the hypothesis testing. 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Investment 
Market 
Main 
Market 
There is a negative relationship between the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales and the decision to go private 
Accepted - 
There is a negative relationship between the performance 
and the decision to go private 
Accepted Accepted 
There is a negative relationship between firm’s growth 
prospects and the decision to go private 
Accepted Accepted 
There is a negative relationship between stock liquidity and 
the decision to go private 
- Accepted 
Source: created by the author. 
 
The survival analysis allowed identifying the financial profile of voluntarily delisted 
firms from both markets. Delisted companies on AIM spent less on capital expenditures and did 
not need an access to the capital market, performed more poorly than their listed counterparts on 
average over the same period and their growth prospects were lower. In addition, these 
companies faced agency costs and were smaller in size and unable to amortize fixed costs of 
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listing. Thus, weak performance in combination with a reduction in listing benefits may explain 
how public status can become too onerous.  
Delisted companies on Main Market also performed more poorly than their listed 
counterparts on average over the same period and there growth prospects were lower. In 
addition, the liquidity of these securities was sharply below the benchmark values. Furthermore, 
delisted companies faced higher agency costs and were smaller in size and as a result amortized 
fixed costs of listing worse. Thus, weak performance with deterioration of liquidity and 
reduction of listing benefits explained the going private decision. So, these factors appear to be 
the primary motivations for delisting on both markets of the London Stock Exchange. 
Thus, the research goal of determining the factors which are related to the company’s 
decision to go private was achieved. The results of the study have a number of managerial 
implications. For the owners of the companies both on Alternative Investment Market and Main 
Market, which have a situation when there is a high level of undistributed free cash flow and low 
growth opportunities, it proved to be wise to go private in order decrease the agency conflict and 
to stimulate managers for an efficient work and not to distribute cash on projects of low 
potential. Since going private transactions are frequently leveraged buyouts, which are financed 
by high debt, the proposal is to delist in order to reduce the agency cost of free cash flows. For 
the investors seeking a profitable strategy it would be important to monitor the companies on the 
Main Market, which have decreasing turnover volume of shares and operating performance, as in 
this case the company is more likely to go private and shareholders can get an excess return like 
in the case of Daisy Group. Moreover, private companies investing in capital expenditures can 
go to the AIM in order to rebalance their financial structure, as the results of the model showed 
the longer time to delist for companies investing in capital expenditures due to the access to the 
capital market. For the London Stock Exchange it is important to enhance the liquidity of shares 
of Main Market companies, because the increased number of delistings due to poor liquidity of 
shares leads to the loss of listing costs for the exchange.   
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